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1,000% INTEREST—GOOD WHILE SUPPLIES
LAST: A STUDY OF PAYDAY LOAN
PRACTICES AND SOLUTIONS
By Nathalie Martin*

Would you pay $1000 in fees to borrow $100 for a period of twenty weeks? Is it
possible that such a loan is even legal? Welcome to the world of payday lending,
one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer credit industry. This Article
describes the practices of payday loan companies and then discusses of some
states’ failed attempts to institute regulation. These legislative efforts frequently
fail because crafty lenders quickly adapt to new legislation by finding loopholes
that undermine any consumer protection provided by the new regulatory laws.
This Article also reports on an empirical study of borrower conduct and
understanding of payday lending terms. This study is one of the first to gather
information about these loans directly from customers at the point of sale. These
study data uncover critical facts, including a deep misunderstanding by most
borrowers of the true cost of the loans. These data also reveal an apparent
inability of many consumers to “do the math” necessary to conceptualize the
structure of the loans. This lack of understanding leaves many consumers unable
to make important comparisons with other forms of credit which may have been
available to them. This study reveals the great need for effective regulation
through legislation, and suggests that a federal usury cap may be the only real
solution.
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INTRODUCTION
A payday loan is a small, short-term, triple-digit interest rate loan,
typically in the range of $200 to $500 dollars, secured by the consumer‘s postdated check or debit authorization. These loans were originally designed to tide a
consumer over until payday, and then be paid back in one lump sum when the
consumer received her paycheck. A typical1 short-term loan product in today‘s
market allows a customer to borrow $400, for fourteen days or less, for a $100
fee.2 The loan is usually designed as an interest-only loan, with the interest
payment—here $100—due every two weeks. Because this is an interest only loan,
the principal essentially stays out forever, while the lender recoups the money he
has loaned in only 4 weeks.
As of March, 2010, more than 19 million U.S. households had taken out
payday loans worth more than $35 billion. 3 Payday and other short-term loan
outlets nearly tripled in number between 1999 and 2006. 4 As of 2006, there were
over 22,000 storefronts nationwide. 5 The Center for Responsible Lending says in
the state of Ohio pay day loan centers outnumber Burger Kings, Wendy's and
McDonalds combined.6 There are 11,000 Starbucks locations in America
compared to 22,000 payday locations,7 and in 29 of the 35 states where payday
lending is legal there are 12,400 McDonalds.8 If this trend continues, payday loans
could prove to be the fastest growing segment of the consumer credit industry, and
if the economy continues to falter, more and more middle-income people may use
this form of credit.
Payday lending and other forms of high-cost, short-term loans are among
the most controversial credit products in the marketplace. These loans vary in
design. In one form of New Mexico loan, the customer borrows $100, to be repaid
in twenty-six bi-weekly installments of $40.16 each, plus a final installment of

1.
The loans on which we gathered data ranged in interest rates from 100% per
annum up to 1100% per annum.
2.
This is a 650% interest rate. Moreover, kept out for one year, this loan
would earn interest of $2600 and the borrower would still owe the $400.
3.
News hour: Payday Lenders Face Increasing Scrutiny (PBS television
broadcast March 16, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/janjune10/payday_03-16.html. (last visted Aug. 18, 2010).
4.
Patrick M. Aul, Note, Federal Usury Law for Service Members: The TalentNelson Amendment, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 163, 165 (2008). See also interview with Study
Participant SB11, who noted that a shop with one employee in 2003 has now grown to have
six employees.
5.
Aul, supra note 4, at 165 n.15.
6.
Gigi Stone, Strapped Homeowners Turn to Bad Loans (ABC television
broadcast April 12, 2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story? id=4641165.
7.
10 Shocking Facts About Payday Loans, PAYDAYLOANS.ORG.,
http://www.paydayloans.org/10-shocking-facts-about-payday-loans (last visited June 5,
2010) (stating that there are two payday locations for every Starbucks).
8.
Payday Lenders v. McDonald’s—available at http://www.csun.edu/~sg4002/
research/mcdonalds _by_state.htm (last visited June 5, 2010).
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$55.34.9 In total, this borrower would pay $100 in principal and $999.71 in
interest, for an APR of 1,147%10 In addition to charging high interest rates,
payday lenders have been criticized for questionable collection tactics and for
targeting minorities.11 The ubiquitous presence of payday loan and other shortterm loan outlets makes them a far easier method of accessing quick cash than
other financing alternatives.
Given both the popularity and the high cost of these loans, they have
attracted the attention of scholars from many disciplines, including economics, 12
9.
Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2010
19:37 EST), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-datapoints-ofthe-day/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
10.
This assumes the lender is not able to convince the borrower to re-borrow the
principal before the loan is paid back. See infra Part I.C.
11.
See ARACELY PANAMEÑO & KEITH CORBETT, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, WEALTH-STRIPPING PAYDAY LOANS TROUBLE COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 7 (2008),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/wealthstripping-payday-loans-trouble-communities-of-color.html (―[p]rominent civil rights groups
such as the NAACP have condemned the practice of payday lending. . . .The NAACP
refuses to accept money from payday lenders for any of its programs.‖ The article quotes
African American leader Julian Bond: ―A drive through any low income neighborhood
clearly indicates people of color are a target market for legalized extortion . . . .Visits to
payday stores . . . are threatening the livelihoods of hardworking families and stripping
equity from entire communities.‖ Id. (quoting Dave Anderton, ―Payday Lending Fees Add
Up:
$3.4
Billion‖
DESERET
NEWS
(Dec.
19,
2003),
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_qn4188/ is_2003 1219/ ai_n11418408).
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) is also
quoted in the CRL Article:
Even if you have a bank account, you can get into trouble if you use
payday lenders as a quick solution rather than building a solid
relationship with a bank or credit union that you can rely on in times of
trouble. These merchants prey upon those who are short of money, but
don‘t feel comfortable asking a bank for a loan.
Id. (quoting MALDEF, MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR MONEY: A GUIDE TO FAMILY
FINANCES FOR LATINOS LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES10 (2007), available at
http://maldef.org/assets/pdf/MALDEF%20Making%20the%20Most%20of%20Your%20Mo
ney%20Handbook.pdf).
As an example of such questionable collection practices, in Valued Services of
Kentucky v. Watkins, 309 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), a customer was trapped in
a payday lender‘s store by a store employee for failure to pay his loan. Id. He informed the
store manager that he could not repay his loan that day, but that he would be able to do so
three days later. Id. The manager insisted that Watkins had to repay the entire amount that
day and stated that he was not leaving the premises until he had paid in full. Id. She pushed
a button to lock the office door and would not allow Watkins to leave even though he
repeatedly asked to do so. Id. She also telephoned her regional manager, Mary Depue, and
told her that ―I have a black guy over here that refuses to pay his bill and he‘s not going to
leave until he does.‖ Id. Watkins later sued for false imprisonment. Id. at 259
12.
TOM LEHMAN, PAYDAY LENDING AND PUBLIC POLICY: WHAT ELECTED
OFFICIALS
SHOULD
KNOW
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Resources/FortheIndustry/ResearchPublicati
ons/WhatElectedOfficialsShouldKnow.pdf.
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business,13 finance, law, sociology, and public policy,14 among others. Even
geographers have written about payday lending, 15 yet some of the most basic
questions about these loans remain unanswered. 16 Scholars have examined the
profitability of payday lenders, the demographic served, the need for the product,
the benefits and detriments of the product, whether the loans create a debt trap for
consumers, and whether regulation works and, if so, what kind of regulation works
best.
However, no one really knows what is going through a payday lending
customer‘s mind when she enters a payday loan center. What other options do
borrowers have, and what is their understanding of the cost of the credit? This
Article attempts to answer these and other questions by reporting on one of the

13.
See Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of
Payday Lending Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POLICY 299 (2008); Adair Morse, Payday
Lenders: Heroes or Villains? (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=999408) (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
14.
See Ronald Mann & James Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
855 (2007); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004); Richard
R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006); Carmen M. Butler &
Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility Save Payday
Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. POL‘Y 119 (2005); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans:
Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin &
Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. the Rent-to-Own Industry: Reaching a
Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385 (1997); Therese Wilson, The
Inadequacy of the Current Regulatory Response to Payday Lending, 32 AUSTL. BUS. L.
REV. 193, 198–206 (2004); Michael Bertics, Note, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of
Greater Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133 (2005); Charles A. Bruch, Comment,
Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable
Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2001); Diane Hellwig,
Note, Exposing the Loan Sharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer
Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2005); Lisa Blaylock
Moss, Commentary, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions &
the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725 (2000); Michael A. Stegman, Payday
Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2007, at 169; Michael A. Stegman & Robert Ferris,
Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q.
8 (2003).
15.
See, e.g., Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation, Landscapes of
Neglect: A Location Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 55 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303
(2003). The geographic data are among the most interesting. For instance, Minnesota data
show that Minnesotans with lower income levels had a higher probability of living near a
payday lending outlet: $15,000: 88%; $30,000: 73%, $45,000: 50%; $60,000: 27%;
$75,000: 12%; $90,000: 5%; $125,000: less than 1%. See H.J. Cummins, Legislators Seek
to Curtail Payday Lending Practices: The Industry Argues that the Proposed Legislation to
Limit Interest Rates Would Effectively Put it Out of Business, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis),
Feb. 24, 2008, at D1 (citing data from the Minnesota Department of Commerce analyzed by
the Legal Services Advocacy Project).
16.
See Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance Credit in
America: An Analysis of Consumer Demand (Monograph No. 35). Washington, DC:
Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, Credit Research Center (2001),
available at http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/analysis_customer_demand.pdf. (last visited
Aug. 18, 2010).
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only empirical studies to date gathering data at the point of sale. This study
explores the following questions, among others: What draws customers to payday
lenders in general and to a particular payday store? What are the loans most
commonly used for? Do people understand the repayment terms? Can they
estimate how much they will pay for a loan in total dollars over time? Do they
understand the meaning of APR? Does statement of the APR help them shop
around for loans? Do people actually compare different payday loans? Do
borrowers have realistic expectations about whether they will be able to pay the
loans back? What alternatives do they have?
In addition to the information gleaned through the curbside interviews,
this Article offers insight for states that are considering implementing legislation,
or that have already passed payday loan consumer protection laws. Because these
curbside data were collected in a state that had just changed its laws to allegedly
protect consumers, the study also captured the creative methods used by the shortterm loan industry to get around states‘ efforts to legislate the industry. Most of
the efforts by states to regulate this industry have failed miserably and this Article
details why.
Effective regulation could save states both time and money and prevent
collateral damage caused by legislation that does not achieve its goals. Ineffective
legislation can be more harmful than no legislation at all because it causes the
public to believe that the issue has been satisfactorily dealt with, even when there
is no appreciable effect on the payday lending industry in the state. Thus, while the
legislative process was not originally a focus of the empirical study described in
this Article, our methodology provides insights into the types of industry changes
that occur after legislation passes, as well as the legislative process in general.
This study gathers these data in three ways, first through a series of cold
calls to lenders to request information about what terms they offer on short-term
loans. Lenders were identified through the most recent Yellow Pages as well as
web-based directories. The second data set was gathered outside payday loan
stores from customers themselves. We interviewed 109 payday or installment loan
customers using the survey attached as Appendix A. 17 These customer interviews
form the primary data for this study. Additionally, because the study was
conducted in a state with a new payday lending statute, the data also revealed
industry changes in response to the new law. As a result of these changes, we were
able to see how the industry operated both before and after institution of the new
law.
The final data set consists of twenty qualitative interviews conducted in
the Author‘s office.18 These interviews were done in order to clarify various
17.
Curbside interviews were conducted June, 2009 to December, 2009 in
Albuquerque, New Mexico and surrounding areas. The interviewees are referred to in this
Article as ―CS‖ followed by a number. The author retains all information in her files.
18.
Office interviews were conducted September 2009 through February 2010,
by the author in the author‘s office in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The interviewees are
referred to in this Article as ―SB‖ followed by a number. The author retains the interview
notes in her files.
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questions raised by the initial study data and to gain additional background
information about customers‘ understanding of these loans. In the interviews
respondents were asked about the survey questions and also were allowed to
expound on their answers, ask further questions, and make any comments they
wished.19
Industry data were generated through borrower interviews and by calling
payday lenders to determine what terms they were offering borrowers. We first
called the lenders in March of 2009. We called a random sample of lenders at this
time, some from chains and some from stand-alone lenders. This initial contact
was meant to determine whether lenders were in general compliance with the new
law, at least by their own self-disclosures. The phone interviews revealed a general
shift in the New Mexico small-loan marketplace from payday loans to a new
product called the ―installment loan.‖ Curbside interviews of both payday and
installment borrowers were conducted next. In June 2009, all short-term or payday
lenders listed in the 2009 Yellow Pages were contacted to determine whether they
offered payday or installment loans, or both. These data on marketplace shifts
provide information highly useful to the legislative process, perhaps more useful
than the results of the curbside interviews themselves.
Part I of this Article provides the background needed to understand the
short-term loan industry. This Part describes the industry‘s self-articulated goals
and its business and marketing plans. Part II describes the legislative process in
one representative state, New Mexico. Part II also explains the recent amendments
to the New Mexico Short Term Loan Act, which was adopted in 2007 and now
purports to regulate payday loans in the state. 20 Moreover, this Part describes how
the payday loan industry in New Mexico changed in response to the new law.
Finally, it discusses the relevance of these changes—as well as of the industry‘s
business and marketing plans—to future legislative efforts, providing useful
information for other states intending to legislate short-term lending.
Part III describes the methodology of the curbside empirical study, as
well as the qualitative and quantitative results. It also contains some data from the
more in-depth office interviews. These data confirm some claims upon which both
in the industry and scholars agree. Specifically, these data confirm that customers
take out loans near home or work out of convenience, rather than shopping around
for price, and that customers do not understand the significance of the annual
percentage rate (APR).

19.
The study questionnaire naively asked about what ―the‖ loan was being used
for, how the customer could calculate the math to understand the cost of ―the‖ loan, etc,
assuming that customers would have just one or at most two loans at a time. It also very
naively assumed that customers had to pay back their loans and could not roll them over,
causing customers to call a loan ―one loan‖ even if it had been out for years. We learned
curbside that we had been vastly underestimating both the numbers of loans people had at a
time, as well as the duration of those loans, and decided to use a different interview format
in the second data collection process in order to learn more. Most of the data from this
second set of interviews will be discussed in a subsequent article.
20.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-1 to 39 (West 2009).
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The data also show that many consumers cannot easily compare the cost
of this form of credit to other forms of credit, and that many customers are unable
to accurately describe how much they will ultimately pay for the small sums they
borrow. Further, they show: that customers generally feel they will pay back the
loans in a short time, despite national statistics to the contrary; that most payday
lenders are repeat customers; and that payday lending is far more convenient, less
intimidating, and less embarrassing than getting a loan from another source. The
data further show that while a few payday lending customers use the loans for onetime emergencies, the vast majority use them for regular, recurring monthly
expenses.21
The data also reveal the ineffectiveness of statutes that define payday
loans as those between fourteen and thirty-five days in duration and then: (1) cap
fees per pay period; (2) create a database; and (3) prohibit rollovers but contain no
cooling off period. This type was recently enacted in New Mexico and the shortterm loan industry tried to get it passed in Arizona as well. However, if a state
intends to protect consumers by regulating these products, laws like New Mexico‘s
are ineffective and inadvisable because they do not change lending practices. In
fact, they have little effect of any kind.22
Part IV provides justification for regulating the short-term loan industry
in light of the empirical data. The analysis starts from the perspective that many
consumer products need not be regulated, but that several unique conditions make
payday lending different. These conditions include (1) market failure;23 (2) largely
innumerate consumers who lack the time, knowledge, or resources to fully
comprehend the dollar costs24 of the loans; and (3) failure of consumers to shop

21.
Our data also show that payday customers are not, for the most part, middle
class, a topic that will be explored in more detail in a subsequent article.
22.
The industry may initially fight legislation like this, but will not fight for
long because the industry knows that: (1) it will still have plenty of customers under this
model, and (2) it can quickly change its products to skirt this form of legislation and perhaps
make even more money.
23.
See infra notes 255-70 and accompanying text. But see SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE
E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 29, 33
(2005), http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/fes3622h334.pdf. Sheila Bair contends
that:
There is no evidence of price collusion or monopolistic concentrations in
the payday loan market. This may suggest that payday loans are
efficiently priced as compared to the relatively high operational costs
associated with the product. Alternatively, it may suggest that the
customers who use the product are sufficiently desperate for cash that
the immediacy of the product is more important than the price paid.
Id. (emphasis added). While the author agrees with Bair‘s latter alternative as a partial
explanation, she does not agree with the premise that there is no collusion.
24.
See generally Ann M. Olazabal & Howard Marmorstein, Structured
Products for the Retail Market: The Regulatory Implications of Investor Innumeracy and
Consumer Information Processing, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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around for loans on the basis of price. Information asymmetry between lenders and
consumers is another compelling reason for regulation of this industry.
Part V concludes that, while there is still a great deal we do not know
about payday lending, we now know that legislation is necessary. This Part
concludes that the question of how best to regulate payday loans is an important
topic that justifies further inquiry. Ultimately, this Article suggests that an absolute
interest rate cap is one possible solution to the short-term loan problem,
particularly in light of the failure of New Mexico-style regulation to have any
meaningful effect on the short-term loan practices.

I. THE SHORT-TERM LOAN BUSINESS PLAN
This Part describes the short-term loan industry in general, with a focus
on payday lending. It describes the industry‘s self-articulated goals and the
publicly available information about the industry‘s business and marketing plans. 25
A. Sky-High Profits
Payday lending is a tremendously profitable business. One need only
review a typical industry website to understand the strong profit motivations of
such lenders:
The payday loan industry may be the fastest growing financial
segment - bar none! Not only can you find a payday loan store
seeminly [sic] everywhere but additionally there are payday loan
web sites as well. As a matter of fact, the payday loan internet
component offers even greater rewards than the payday loan brickn-mortar!
So, why is this so? Why is the payday loan industry growing at such
a rapid rate? And why are a few of the most saavy [sic] financial
minds entering this ―loan shark‖ business segment? The answer, of
course, is the TREMENDOUS PROFITS AVAILABLE!
Depending on the state or province, payday loan consumers are
paying $10 to $35 per $100 borrowed for a term averaging 8 days.
These cash advance fees are equivalent to 480% to 1200% APR‘s
(Annual Percentage Rate). These returns are simply
PHENOMINAL [sic]!
[C]onsumers throughout the world have an insatiable demand for
the payday loan product! Small loans ranging from a few hundred

25.
This information about the industry was gathered from existing literature as
well as the websites of both industry and consumer groups. See, e.g., CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2009);
Trihouse Enterprises, Inc., How to Start a Payday Loan Business, Start a Cash Advance
Company, http://www.paydayloanindustry.com/payday-loan-internet.html, (last visited
Aug. 5, 2009); Resources for Policymakers, COMMUNITY FIN. SERVS. ASS‘N OF AM.,
http://www.cfsa.net/policymakers_resources.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2009). We attempted
to spend equal time at sites written by consumers and the industry, in order to get the full
picture of what each side of the debate was saying.
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dollars to $1500 or more are in huge demand by cash strapped
consumers everywhere on this planet. . . .
Payday loans, just in the USA, are estimated to be a $40 billion to
$50 billion dollar industry and still growing 20% to 30% annually!
. . . A typical 8 day paycheck advance extended to your client will
yield an annual percentage rate on your money of 805%!26

Dan Feehan, CEO of payday lender Cash America, has said that ―the
theory in the business is you‘ve got to get that customer in, work to turn him into a
repetitive customer, long-term customer, because that‘s really where the profit
is.‖27 While some scholars have questioned the profitability of the industry 28 and
the industry sometimes denies that its returns are excessive, the mere existence of
such a large number of lenders belies the conclusion that these loans are not highly
profitable.
B. The History of Payday Lending and the Current Lending Practice
According to some, the payday lending industry initially grew from the
salary-buying business of the early twentieth century. Salary buyers advanced cash
at steep fees on the security of a wage assignment. 29 If the loan was not repaid or
renewed on time, the salary buyer would threaten to present the wage assignment
to the borrower‘s employer, who might then terminate the employee. 30
Other people in the industry claim that payday lending grew out of the
check-cashing business. Professors Ronald Mann and James Hawkins talked to an
executive in the check-cashing industry who described the emergence of postdated check cashing:
Payday loans grew out of that business in the early 1990‘s. We
would cash a personal check on the weekend for 10% of the check,
26.
See
How
to
Start
a
Cash
Advance
Business,
http://www.cashadvanceprofits.com (last visited July 22, 2010). See also Payday Pundit:
The Latest News and Information About the Payday lending Industry, PAYDAY PUNDIT (Jan.
5, 2010), http://paydaypundit.org/2010/01/05/. The numbers in these websites are at odds
with other information promulgated by the payday loan industry that claims it is not that
profitable, but these web sites are surely not entirely without basis.
27.
Payday Lending: Research and Analysis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/payday-loanreform-act-must-be-strengthened.html (last visited July 20, 2010).
28.
See, e.g., Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices
Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 203 (2007).
29.
Robert Mayer, One Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending
Abuse in Milwaukee County 2 (undated) (working paper), available at
http://lwvmilwaukee.org/mayer21.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2009).
30.
Id. at 2-3: ―Today a post-dated check has replaced the wage assignment as
the security for a payday loan. [Lenders] require an open checking account and a steady
income source (usually a paycheck, but pension or W-2 income is also accepted) to get a
short-term cash advance. The process is quick and convenient, with many chains using the
TeleTrack system to assess the risk for this subprime segment of the credit market.‖
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but most payroll checks or government checks we would cash for
3%. So people would come to us on Thursday and ask if we would
cash it then and hold it until Monday. For a while we said no we
wouldn‘t do that, then we started trying it out, found there was a
demand for cashing post-dated checks, and slowly gravitated into
that, charging an extra 5% or so for the extra risk and service.
People loved it. Their options, when they are in a bind, are that they
can write a check that will go on insufficient funds, but they‘ll get a
charge of $35/check. So if they write three checks for $100 they will
get $105 in fees, which is a pretty bad alternative. Or they can
accept the late-rent penalty. Or they can put off fixing their car and
lose two or three days of work.31

In any case, payday lending first emerged in the South in the late 1980s
and grew rapidly during the following decade. 32 Payday lenders typically assess a
borrower‘s creditworthiness using the industry-wide TeleTrack credit reporting
system and then offer a loan through a retail store location.33 The industry depends
heavily on retail store locations, because customers usually travel only to the store
that is nearest their place of employment.34 The industry is aware that convenience
is a main draw of payday lending and accordingly does its best to provide optimal
accessibility.35
Payday lending locations are normally small, with outstanding loan
portfolios of less than $100,000 and annual revenues of about $350,000. 36 As
stores age, their profitability increases. For instance, a typical new store will make
fewer than 1000 loans per year, while a mature store will make more than 8500
loans per year.37 Because a store‘s costs are fixed, the costs per loan from the
mature stores are much lower than the costs per loan from the newer stores.38

31.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 862 (footnote omitted).
32.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 3.
33.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 863–64. Mann and Hawkins found,
through industry information and interviews, that lenders typically look at a borrower‘s
identification, evidence of income, and a current bank statement. Id. at 862–63. They also
evaluate past borrowing history and the other criteria using a software program functionally
parallel to the credit scoring that credit card issuers use to evaluate their customers. Id. at
863. They also claim that some lenders use TeleTrack to access information about a
borrower‘s prior payment history with payday lenders. Id. This information is consistent
with what payday lenders told customers (and our researchers) was needed to qualify for a
payday loan. See id. at 863 n.19.
34.
Id. at 863.
35.
When describing a new survey of payday lending customer habits in Alberta,
Canada, an industry webpage states that ―[a] number of other studies of our industry have
consistently pointed out the same thing; IT‘S ABOUT CONVENIENCE!‖ New Payday
Loan Industry Survey Results Available, PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG (June 6, 2009),
http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/new-payday-loan-industry-survey-results-available.
36.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 864.
37.
See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs
Justify the Price? 9 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-
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C. The Importance of Repeat Customers
Both industry experts and small loan foes acknowledge that repeat
customers are important to the payday lending business model.39 Some lenders
even offer loyalty programs and rewards cards, like those offered by bakeries and
pizza shops. These programs encourage borrowers to become repeat customers
with offers such as: if you ―pay your interest five times in a row on time, you get
your sixth interest payment at half price.‖ 40
Multiple empirical studies have reported that repeat customers comprise
the vast majority of all payday lending customers. For example, a study by the
Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), using data from North Carolina regulators,
reports that 91% of loans are made to borrowers with five or more loans per year.41
Another CRL study found that 76% of payday lending business comes from repeat
customers.42 Similarly, a study of Colorado borrowers found that about 65% of
loan volume in that state comes from customers who borrow more than twelve
times per year.43 Some borrowers avoid renewal limits by alternating between
lenders, using the funds from each lender to pay off the other in turn. 44 Professors
Mark Flannery and Katherine Samolyk report in their 2005 Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) study that about 46% of all loans are either
renewals of existing loans or new loans that follow immediately upon the payment
of an existing loan (―rollovers‖).45

09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). In the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) study, a mature store was one more than four years old. Id. at 8–9.
38.
See ERNST & YOUNG TAX POL‘Y SERVS. GROUP, THE COST OF PROVIDING
PAYDAY LOANS IN CANADA 39–43 (2004), available at http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/EYPaydayLoanReport.pdf. Chris Robinson at York University has
made this same point: large operations have lower costs than small operations, allowing
larger lenders to make a profit with stricter rate caps. CHRIS ROBINSON, REGULATION OF
PAYDAY LENDING IN CANADA (2006); see also James Daw, Consumer Protection in the
Wind on Payday Loans, TORONTO STAR, May 30, 2006, at D6 (discussing the Robinson
report).
39.
See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 864.
40.
Interview with Study Participant SB01 (discussing interest-only loans with
Ace Cash Express). One downside is that if customers want to use their loyalty points
toward their next interest payment, they cannot pay down any amount toward principal. Id.
41.
KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2, 7 (2004), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/researchanalysis/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
42.
LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS,
ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 11 (2009), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demandfinal.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
43.
See Paul Chessin, Borrowing From Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis
of Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 411 (2005).
44.
Id. at 415.
45.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 37, at 12–13, fig.2.
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The costs of serving high-frequency borrowers are less than the costs of
serving low-frequency borrowers, both because the loss ratios are significantly
lower for high-frequency borrowers and because the operating costs are lower. 46
As sources in the industry explained to Mann and Hawkins, a loan to a first-time
borrower will probably require verification of a telephone number and a bank
account, as well as some investigation of the identity of the borrower. 47 Those
steps, which are costly in the context of a loan with a fee of only $30, are
unnecessary for repeat customers. Also, unlike new customers, repeat borrowers
have demonstrated a propensity to repay. 48
Lenders use time-tested methods to attract new borrowers into their
portfolio, including offering a free payday loan to first-time borrowers49 and
offering money to existing customers for referring new ones.50 Since loans to
repeat customers are cheaper to administer, lenders do what they can to encourage
repeat borrowing, including calling customers as soon as a loan is paid back and
offering them even more money. 51 Study data show that people generally return to
the original lender unless they have had a bad experience with a particular lender
or, as the saying goes, need to ―borrow from Peter to pay Paul.‖52 And, as with
credit cards and other forms of consumer financing, lenders discourage paying off
the loans by making it difficult or impossible to pay part of the principal on
interest-only loans designed to rollover automatically, 53 and by encouraging
additional borrowing as installment loans get paid off.54
Borrowers also frequently take simultaneous payday loans from multiple
lenders. A Wisconsin study of bankruptcy data showed that many payday loan
customers take out loans from more than one lender, frequently in amounts that
exceed their paychecks. Professor Robert Mayer explained that such multiple loans
make roll-overs inevitable and collectively function like a long-term, high-rate
interest-only cash advance.55
46.
Id. at 16–17.
47.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 865.
48.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 865.
49.
PARRISH & KING, supra note 42, at 3; see also study data infra Part III.B. Our
calls to payday lenders, as well as the signs outside many of their stores, confirm that a
significant portion of the remaining payday lending market is now offering the first loan
free.
50.
Interview with Study Participant CS05 (lender offering $20 to refer a new
customer, compared to the $10 they could get doing our study interview).
51.
Interview with Study Participant SB12 (discussing that she was called less
than a week after paying off her first loan in full and offered ―a raise,‖ meaning a loan in
twice the amount she originally qualified for).
52.
Interview with Study Participant CS61who stated she had four loans at one
time totaling about $1000. She got one, then the others to pay back the first one. She
eventually declared bankruptcy.
53.
See interview with Study Participant SB01.
54.
See, e.g., interviews with Study Participants SB01, CS21, CS27, CS34,
CS44.
55.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 2-3. Mayer notes that:
[P]ayday advance creditors in Milwaukee County repeatedly make
loans to debtors in financial crisis who already have one or more payday
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Mayer examined a sample of 500 bankruptcy petitions filed by residents
of Milwaukee County during the summer of 2004, looking for petitions that listed
more than one payday loan.56 If his sample is representative of the entire
population filing for bankruptcy in Milwaukee County, then roughly 825
households went bankrupt in the county in 2003 owing more than one payday loan
at a time (10.6% of all petitioners). 57 Some petitions listed as many as nine of these
loans, and the median debtor claiming one or more of these debts owed the entire
amount of her next paycheck to payday lenders. Most of the debtors had been
rolling over the principal for many months. 58 In fact, 70% of the people who listed
a payday loan on their petition had more than one. Almost 30% had four or more. 59
In the context of installment loans, one of the preferred replacement
products for payday loans in New Mexico,60 reliance on repeat customers is as
great or greater as it is with payday loans. Lenders encourage employees to get
customers to take out as many new loans as possible, and there are no explicit laws
precluding these practices. As one former employee explained:
[W]e were trained to encourage customers the day they paid a loan
off to make another loan as early as the next day. We tried to get
customers to keep getting loans and borrow up to their maximum
approval amount whether they wanted it or not.61

This former clerk went on to explain that store employees were instructed
to pressure installment loan customers to borrow more when they came in to make
a payment.62 She explained that this would allow the lender to reissue the loan and

loans. Together these loans frequently exceed the amount of the
borrower‘s next paycheck, making roll-overs inevitable. The debtor has
one payday but many payday loans, and when combined in this way
these loans function like a large, long-term, very expensive, interestonly cash advance.
Id. at 2.
56.
Id.
57.
Id., at 2-3.
58.
Id.
59.
Id., at 5.
60.
As discussed in further detail in Part II.B.1, infra, when the New Mexico
payday lending statute passed, lenders quickly began offering a replacement product that
fell outside the new law, called an installment loan. It is entirely unregulated and thus can
be rolled over indefinitely. There are neither caps on fees nor other rules, so lenders can
offer whatever terms they like. The other replacement product is the interest-only payday
style loan for which no post-dated check is required.
61.
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FACT V. FICTION: THE TRUTH ABOUT
PAYDAY
LENDING
INDUSTRY
CLAIMS
(2001),
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/fact-v-fiction-thetruth-about-payday-lending-industry-claims.html; see also interview with Study Participant
CS44.
62.
See interview with Study Participant CS44. Another participant, who had
both payday loans and title loans, reported on a title loan on which he had defaulted. The car
was repossessed within a short time, but the default did not put off the lender, who quickly
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reset the whole payment plan.63 She said she would be reprimanded by her
manager if she did not try to pressure people into rewriting their loans in a way
that would essentially wipe out all the payments previously made on the loans.64
She was told to do this every time someone came in to make a payment, in order to
increase the lender‘s interest and fees. It was very clear to this employee that
rewriting or resetting, rather than initiating loans, was the bread and butter of the
business.65
In our survey process, we had an opportunity to look at several
installment loan receipts, the documents customers receive when they make a
payment. In all cases, the receipt was a half-page statement of what the customer
had paid that day and what was still outstanding, as well as this statement: ―[y]ou
are entitled to borrow $85.00 more today!‖ This was the only item in bold on the
entire page. The former employee said that clerks were instructed to point this
statement out to customers whenever they came in to make a payment. 66
D. The Importance of Late Fees
Industry websites enthusiastically acknowledge that lenders make more
money when customers pay late. For example, one site explains why internet
lending is so lucrative, along with the importance of late fees:
Think about it! A typical payday loan customer who applies for and
receives 3 payday loans per year for ten years is worth a minimum
of $2400. (Conservatively, a payday loan customer gets 3ea $400
payday loans at 20/$100 loaned = $80 in fees per loan X 3 times/yr
= $240/yr X 10 years = $2400 life time value. Add on late fees, their
family and friend referrals, etc. and each customer is worth $3000 or
more!)67

In fact, industry experts suggest dividing payday loans into three or more
smaller loans to maximize late fee assessments. They even recommend telling
customers their checks have been deposited when they have not, so that the
customers will be scared into believing they will bounce checks as a result. 68
starting calling back and offering another loan in an even greater amount. See interview
with Study Participant SB20.
63.
The language of this person‘s interview suggests that she also did not
understand how the loans worked, even though she was an employee.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
See interview with Study Participant CS44.
67.
Payday Loan Industry Blog, available at http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/
index.php?s=%22 each+customer+is+worth+%243000%22 (last visited Aug 9, 2010).
68.
See Michaelsmom, Post to Answers, DEBT CONSOLIDATION CARE, (Aug. 13,
2006, 7:37 AM), http://www.debtconsolidationcare.com/getting-loan/payday-industry.html.
The post claims that ―in 2002, Affordable Payday Loan Consultants, now called Trihouse
Enterprises Inc., produced a business plan it sold to people wanting to get started in the
payday industry.‖ Id. One tip from the Trihouse webpage states that ―late fees are a very
lucrative profit center. You do not need to actually present a client‘s check(s) to the bank to
have them stamp (non-sufficient funds). Purchase your own stamp! They owe the NSF fee
even if you did not take it to the bank. You simply say, ‗My bank verifies funds before
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E. Service with a Smile
Finally, these study data suggest that payday lenders are aware that many
lower-income people are intimidated by banks. 69 Thus, the lenders try to create an
environment that is as welcoming and friendly as possible. Curbside interviews
confirmed that some customers wanted to protect their ―friends‖ at the lenders and
not get them in trouble. 70 While not addressed directly in the survey, respondents
frequently volunteered that the service at payday lenders was good. 71
F. The Debt Trap
The payday lending industry claims it helps people make ends meet.72
Given the demographics of the payday customers in this study, the loan design,
and the other expenses of people within this demographic, very few customers can
afford to pay back the loans. Rather, as discussed above, most find it necessary to
continue to pay $1000 to borrow $500 for twenty weeks, or to pay $100 in interest
every two weeks for the rest of time, for an original loan of $400. 73
Thus, while people can disagree about the precise definition of a debt
trap—and whether these loans create one—given the cost of this credit and the
industry‘s own business plan and articulated profit margins, it is hard to fathom
that anyone actually believes these loans do not create a debt trap. It is likely that
the industry‘s own very detailed TeleTrack data, which comes from the industry‘s
credit checking system, show precisely that. Short-term loan products like payday
loans create a debt trap by design.74 In fact, the debt trap is the business plan.
In sum, the business plan of short-term lenders appears to include setting
up convenient and ubiquitous storefronts, hiring extremely friendly clerks,
building a base of loyal customers, maximizing the frequency and amount of
accepting my deposit. Unfortunately, (your check was no good). The fee is $15 per check.‘‖
Id.; see also CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 61.
69.
See interview with Study Participants SB01, CS46.
70.
See interview with Study Participants CS23, CS57.
71.
See interview with Study Participants CS23, CS33, CS45.
72.
See Carl Chancellor, ―What the Mob Can Learn from Payday Lenders,‖
CHANGE.ORG (March 1,
2010), available at http://uspoverty.change.org/blog/view/
what_the_mob_ can _learn_ from_payday_ lenders (last visited Aug. 17, 2010. ―According
to the Center for Responsible Lending, U.S. borrowers who rely upon high-interest payday
lending for quick cash are caught in a "debt trap" that costs them $3.4 billion each year.
***
[t]here is no arguing the fact that it's a very lucrative arrangement for payday lenders to
follow a business plan designed to keep a borrower in debt.‖
73.
The $25 per $100 every two weeks amounts to 650% per annum.
74.
See Chancellor supra, note 71: ―According to the Center for Responsible
Lending, U.S. borrowers who rely upon high-interest payday lending for quick cash are
caught in a "debt trap" that costs them $3.4 billion each year.
***
[t]here is no arguing the fact that it's a very lucrative arrangement for payday lenders to
follow a business plan designed to keep a borrower in debt.‖
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lending while maintaining repayment at the minimum amount required by law, and
encouraging late payments to maximize fees. With this information as a backdrop,
it is worthwhile to consider the legislative process in New Mexico, and attendant
industry changes. The New Mexico legislation is increasingly relevant because
several other states are currently considering implementing identical laws.

II. CHANGES IN LAW AND SHORT-TERM LOAN PRACTICE IN NEW
MEXICO
This Part describes the legislative process in New Mexico as well as the
law that state enacted in 2007. It also describes the changes in the industry in New
Mexico following enactment of the 2007 law. Finally, it discusses the relevance of
these changes on future legislative efforts in light of the industry‘s apparent
sidestep of the law. This information should be useful to other states that choose to
regulate short-term lending.
A. Changes in the Law
Payday lenders began appearing in New Mexico after the state repealed
its General Usury statute (former NMSA 1978 § 56-8-11-1) in 1991. Prior to the
summer of 2007, New Mexico was one of only two states 75 that had no regulation
of payday lending. For five very long and frustrating years, the New Mexico
legislature debated various payday lending statutes. Finally, during the legislative
session of 2007, the New Mexico state legislature adopted a set of changes to the
New Mexico Small Loan Act of 1955 intended to address payday lending in New
Mexico. These regulations went into effect in July 2007. The New Mexico law is
similar to those of several other states in that the regulations rely on a computer
database enforcement mechanism for consumer qualification and reporting. 76 In
fact, thirty-three states have laws that bear some similarity to the New Mexico Act.
77
This is remarkable when one considers that none are effective in curbing payday
loan abuses.
75.
Testimony of Uriah King, Center for Responsible Lending, before the Ohio
Senate Finance and Financial Institutions Committee (May 7, 2008). See Transcript page
10, notes 2 and 3, available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policylegislation/states/king-ohio-payday-testimony-05072008.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). .
76.
Other states that have enacted similar statutes and use the same database
enforcement mechanisms include Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.103–.144, .402–.408
(West 2002)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 3101-3119 (West, Westlaw through
Chap. 170, 2010 2d Sess., 52d Leg.)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-7-101 to -414
(West 2006 & Supp. 2008)), Illinois (815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/1-1 to 99-99 (West
Supp. 2008)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2121–.2173 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 2010, No. 109, 2010 Sess., 95th Leg.)) and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-08-01 to -15 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007)).
77.
ALA. CODE §§ 5-18-1 to -23 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2008); ALASKA
STAT. ANN. §§ 06.50.010–.900 (2008); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 23000–23106 (West 2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-3.1-101 to -123 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, §§ 2201–2213A, 2227–2243 (2001 & Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE § 26-301 to -323
(LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.103–.144, .402–.408 (West 2002); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 480F-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-46-401 to
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The stated purpose of the recent New Mexico law is to ensure ―more rigid
public regulation and supervision‖ of lenders and to ―facilitate the elimination of
abuse of borrowers.‖78 The Act further states that its intention is to ―establish a
system which will more adequately provide honest and efficient small loan service
and stimulate competitive reduction in charges.‖ 79
The Act, with a few exceptions,80 applies to lenders engaged in the
business of lending amounts of $2,500 or less.81 A payday loan is defined in the
Act as a loan with a duration of fourteen to thirty-five days, for which the
consumer gives the lender a check or debit authorization for the amount of the loan
plus interest and fees.82 In exchange, the lender agrees to defer presentment of that
instrument until the consumer‘s next payday, or another date agreed upon by the
lender and the consumer. 83 The lender then pays the amount represented by the
-413 (2005 & Supp. 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/1-1 to 99-99 (West Supp. 2008);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-7-101 to -414 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 533D.1–.16 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404 (2001); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 286.9-010 to -.991 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:3578.1–8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2121–
.2173 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2010, No. 109, 2010 Sess., 95th Leg.); MINN. STAT.
§ 47.60 (West, Westlaw through 2010 sess., Chap. 180–200, 202–214); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 75-67-501 to -539 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.500–.510 (West,
Westlaw through Jul. 7, 2010 of 2010 Sess., 95th Leg.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-701 to
729 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-901 to -929
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.010–.940 (West,
Westlaw through 2009 Sess., 75th Leg.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-08-01 to -15 (West
2004 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 3101-3119 (West, Westlaw through
Chap. 170, 2010 2d Sess., 52d Leg.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14.4-1 to -10 (West,
Westlaw through Chap. 392 of Jan. 2009 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-110 to -290
(West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-4-36 to -69 (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-101 to -117 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 1st Ex. Sess. & Apr. 14, 2010 Sess.) and TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0180-28.01 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 31, 2010); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604 (Vernon 2006 &
Supp. 2008) and TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 342.251–.259 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-23-01 to -504 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1444 to -471 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) and 10 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-200-10 to 130 (West, Westlaw through 26:18 VA.R. May 10, 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 31.45.010–200 (West 2008) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-630-120 to -270 (West,
Westlaw through May 19, 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-362 to -364 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 Sess.). Fourteen other states have usury caps on all small loans. These states
are Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West
Virginia.
78.
§ 58-15-1(D).
79.
Id.
80.
§ 58-15-3(B) and (C) (exempting certain individuals and banking institutions
from the provisions of the New Mexico Small Loans Act of 1955).
81.
§ 58-15-3(A). These lenders are required to obtain a license from the New
Mexico Financial Institutions Division (FID) and to comply with all aspects of the Act.
82.
See § 58-15-2(H).
83.
Id.
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check or debit authorization, minus interest and fees, to the consumer.84 In the end,
this narrow definition of payday lending defanged the legislation. The industry
quickly switched to loan products that fell outside the statute, namely longer loans
or those not involving a post-dated check; these loans are not regulated at all.
1. Fee Cap
The Act limits administrative fees and interest on payday loans to $15.50
per $100 borrowed 85 plus an additional $0.50 per loan for fees charged by the
consumer information database provider. 86 While this appears to be a great
improvement over the unregulated rates that were charged in New Mexico prior to
implementation of the Act, which sometimes resulted in loans at 2,500% per
annum, this fee structure still results in an APR of at least 417%, assuming the
longest possible repayment period of fourteen days.87
2. The Allegedly Free Installment Plan
The Act also provides that a lender must offer every consumer the
―opportunity to enter into an unsecured payment plan for any unpaid
administrative fees and principal balance [owed on] the payday loan.‖88 The Act
specifies that the payment plan must permit payment of the unpaid balance of the
loan, in relatively equal installments, over a period of a minimum of 130 days,
with no interest or fees added.89 While the payment plan option appears to protect
consumers, the Act contains several disincentives for consumers to convert these
loans to free payment plans. First, the Act does not require a ―cooling-off period,‖
or waiting period between loans, for a regular payday loan. 90 The statute does,

84.
See Id., The Act includes in the definition of a payday loan product a payday
loan that has been converted to a payment plan pursuant to § 58-15-2(I).
85.
§ 58-15-33(B).
86.
§ 58-15-33(C).
87.
This is still at the high end of rates permitted in other states that have
implemented laws similar to the Act. For example, the following is a sampling of the
transaction fees charged by other states per $100 borrowed:
Florida:
$10
Oklahoma:
$15 on first $300 then $10
Indiana:
$15 on first $250, $13 on next $150, $10 on next $150
Illinois:
$15
Michigan:
Stepped from $15 to $11 depending on amount borrowed
North Dakota:
$20
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r 69 V-560.905 (West, Westlaw through Chap 279, 2010
Sess., 21st Leg.); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 59 § 3108 (West, Westlaw through Chap. 170, 2d
Sess., 52d Leg.); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-201 (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Sess.); 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/2‑5 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1015, excluding 96-1000,
1002, 1004, 1008, 1012, 2010 Sess.) ($15.50 per $100); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 487.2153 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2010, No. 109, 2010 Sess., 95th Leg.); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 13-08-12(2) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
88.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-35(A).
89.
Id. § 58-15-35(B), (C).
90.
A cooling-off period is a period after the repayment of a loan during which
the consumer may not take out another payday loan from any payday lender regardless of
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however, require a ten-day cooling-off period after the repayment of a loan that
has been converted to a payment plan.91 Additionally, the cooling-off period does
not start until the consumer has paid off all other outstanding payday loans. 92
Various parts of the law discourage use of the free payment plan. 93
In March 2009, when at least some lenders were attempting to operate
under the new law, very few clerks offered information about this free installment
loan to researchers who called to inquire about how to get a loan. After significant
prodding (―But isn‘t there some requirement that I be allowed to pay over time?‖),
some clerks attempted to explain the free installment payment plan. The clerks,
who were overall exceedingly friendly, sometimes tried to make the caller feel
guilty about entering the payment plan. They explained that the customer could
pay back the loan over five months (sometimes described as twenty weeks). One
clerk explained that ―the payment plan is bad for everybody, bad for us, bad for
you.‖ What was so bad for the customer? To start, one cannot enter into another
payday loan ―for a long time‖ as one claimed, or ―during the entire time the
installment plan is out,‖ explained another. Also, the database reflects that the
person went into the payment plan. This seemed to imply that other lenders would
be discouraged from lending to someone who had used a repayment plan. 94

whether the consumer would otherwise be qualified for such a loan under the Act. The
period is typically a few days. Ten days is a relatively long cooling-off period by industry
standards, where cooling-off periods generally range from one to seven days and are often
limited to the lender with whom the paid-off loan was originated. For example, Florida has
a twenty-four hour cooling-off period, North Dakota has a three day waiting period with the
same lender, and Indiana has a seven day waiting period with the same lender. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(4) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 560.404(19)
(West, Westlaw through Chap. 279, 2010 2nd Sess., 21st Leg.). IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7401(2) (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Sess.). Indiana‘s cooling off period kicks in only
after taking out five loans. IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-401(2).
91.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-36.
92.
Id. Cooling-off periods are considered beneficial by consumer groups
because they help prevent ―touch-and-go‖ rollovers which allow a consumer to repay a
payday loan and immediately take out another loan for the same amount. The New Mexico
Act does not prevent such abuses. No cooling-off period is required for standard payday
loans, only for people who enter into free installment plans.
93.
Consumers need not discover this disincentive on their own. Customers in
our study reported that lenders openly dissuaded them from using the free installment
plan—if they disclose the free installment plan requirement at all. Thus, this provision may
make it easier for lenders to steer consumers away from the payment plan option into other,
more expensive and risky alternatives such as another payday loan, or their new progeny,
the non-free installment loan. For a consumer who makes frequent use of payday loans, the
requirements for a cooling-off period and payment of all other payday loans may effectively
rule out the payment plan option. This is unfortunate because regular users of payday loans
are one of the groups of consumers who might benefit from payment plan loans as a way to
break the cycle of borrowing and debt.
94.
Eventually, in the late summer and fall of 2009, discussions with clerks or
customers about free payment plan became obsolete, because lenders were offering almost
exclusively products outside the statute and thus were under no legal obligation to offer the
repayment plan.
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3. Rollovers, Cooling-Off Periods, and Touch and Go Loans
The Act ostensibly prohibits what are known in the industry as
―rollovers,‖ but does not actually do so. 95 A rollover is a transaction in which the
lender allows the consumer to delay payment of the loan principal for another pay
period by paying only the interest due on the transaction. Consumer groups
consider rollovers a particularly insidious problem because they trap a consumer
into potentially paying the interest on a loan indefinitely without ever reducing the
principal balance. The Act refers to rollovers as ―renewed payday loans, and
purports to preclude them.‖96 The definition of a renewed payday loan includes
using the proceeds from one loan to pay off another loan with the same lender.
The Act nominally prevents rollovers by prohibiting lenders from
entering into an agreement for a renewed payday loan, or otherwise refinancing or
extending the term of a payday loan, 97 and by prohibiting lenders from requiring
consumers to ―enter into a new payday loan [in order] to pay [off] an existing
payday loan . . . when the existing loan is eligible for a payment plan.‖98 These
provisions do not, however, prevent ―touch-and-go‖ rollovers or ―back-to-back‖
loans—transactions where the consumer repays a loan in full and then immediately
takes out another loan for the same amount.99 While the Act appears on its face to
prohibit the lender from loaning the consumer the funds to repay an existing loan,
because there is no cooling-off period between standard payday loans, the
consumer can repay one payday loan and take out another for the same amount, or
more, in essentially a single transaction. 100 As discussed above, because of the
possible perception of penalties associated with converting standard payday loans
to payment plan loans, consumers may choose touch-and-go rollovers as an
alternative.101 The payday loan without the post-dated check, one of the popular
95.
Id. § 58-15-34(A).
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. § 58-15-34(E).
99.
Remar Sutton, Avoiding “Loan” Schemes and other “Services” Risky to your
Financial Well-Being, DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION STREETWISE (Nov. 2008)
http://www.dcu.org/streetwise/november2008.html.
100.
Id.
101.
A number of other states have prohibited rollovers by imposing cooling-off
periods between loans, either from the same lender or other payday lenders. For example,
Florida requires a twenty-four hour cooling-off period between the pay off of one loan and
the taking out of another by the same consumer. North Dakota requires a three day waiting
period after the repayment of a loan by a consumer before that consumer can take out
another loan with the same licensee. Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), in its Guidelines for Payday Lending, recommends that lending
institutions under its purview be required to establish ―cooling-off‖ periods between the
paying off of a payday loan and the granting of another application as ―prudent risk
management‖ for the lending institution. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FIL14-2005,
GUIDELINES
FOR
PAYDAY
LENDING
(2005),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html; see also Veritec Solutions,
White Paper Analysis of the Center for Responsible Lending Report: Springing the Debt
Trap: Rate caps are Only Proven Payday Lending Reform (2007), VERITEC.COM,
http://www.veritecs.com/2008_01_CRL_Whitepaper_Analysis.pdf.
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products in New Mexico today, is an interest-only loan for the life of the loan.
Thus, the loan is designed for a lifetime of rollovers.
4. Loans are Limited to 25% of a Person’s Gross Income
Another protection included in the Act limits the total amount a consumer
can accumulate in payday loans at any given time to 25% of the consumer‘s gross
monthly income.102 Because the database used to enforce this provision is not used
in the case of loans that fall outside the law, these loans do not go into the
database. Thus, the database serves no purpose. 103
5. No Limit on Total Payday Loans Per Customer
The Act does not limit the number of payday loans a consumer may have
over a given span of time (e.g., one year). This means a consumer could have up to
25% of their gross monthly income continuously tied up in debt to payday lenders,
even as the law is written.104
6. Right of Rescission
Additionally, the Act gives the consumer the right to rescind the contract
by returning all funds advanced by the lender before 5:00 p.m. on the business day
following the day on which the loan was obtained. 105 The lender may not charge a
fee for the rescinded transaction.106 Of course, this protection does not apply to
loans outside the statute.
102.
Interestingly, the industry‘s own best practices do not suggest a cooling-off
period. According to the CRL, income limit requirements do not necessarily help consumers
avoid becoming trapped in debt. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING THE DEBT
TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM (2007), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/springing-the-debttrap.pdf. Because the restriction is based on the consumer‘s gross income, and thus on a
dollar figure that the consumer does not actually have available, it does not relate directly to
the consumer‘s ability to repay the loan. Additionally, the income figure is for an entire
month but in most cases the term of the loan is for only two weeks, meaning that the
consumer only has half of the stated income with which to attempt to repay the loan.
103.
One customer had five loans on which she paid $100 a month, and she made
only $685 from disability benefit payments. The loans did not involve a post-dated check,
however, so none made it into the database. See interview with Study Participant SB12.
104.
The Act limits the various penalties and fees that lenders may charge.
Lenders are prohibited from charging penalties for early repayment of a loan. The Act also
prohibits charging fees for late repayment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-33(E) (West, Westlaw
through 2010 2d Reg. & Spec. Sess., 49th Leg.). This section limits the fee that a lender
may charge for insufficient funds in the consumer‘s account on the date the loan is due to a
single $15 charge. This section also allows the lender to present a given check or debit
authorization to the consumer‘s financial institution only once. However, the Act permits
the consumer to waive this protection and permit the lender to present the instrument one
additional time. The waiver must be in writing. Id.
105.
Id. § 58-15-32(C).
106.
As set out above, the Act requires clerks to tell customers that they had the
right to cancel the loan at no charge any time before 5:00 p.m. the next day. Of the
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7. The Database
One of the most seemingly significant provisions of the Act requires
lenders to use a commercially reasonable method to verify that a consumer‘s
income qualifies her for a payday loan. 107 Lenders were required to begin using
this method no later than November 30, 2007, 108 and the New Mexico Financial
Institutions Division (FID) certified Veritec, Inc. for this purpose. 109 Without this
system, a lender could not check whether an individual was currently participating
in a payment plan or had payday loans totaling more than 25% of their gross
salary.110 Since 2001, Veritec has provided similar services for regulation of
payday lending institutions in several other states, including Florida, Oklahoma,
Michigan, Illinois, North Dakota, and Indiana.111
8. The Results
New Mexico spent several years attempting to regulate payday lending,
the results of which are detailed above. Compared with the lack of regulation in
New Mexico before the legislation, the Act appeared to offer substantial
customers in our study who reportedly took out payday loans, 78% reported that they were
not informed about the right to cancel the loan by 5:00 p.m. the next business day. These
data are questionable, however, because we are not sure customers were able to tell if they
were getting a payday loan or an installment loan.
107.
See . N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-32(A) to 58-15-37(A).
108.
Id. § 58-15-37(C).
109.
See Veritec Solutions, State of New Mexico Payday Loan Transaction
System, https://www.nmpdl.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Jul. 18, 2010).
110.
According to its website, ―Veritec was established in 1988 to provide
program management services to State agencies, and Veritec Solutions, LLC was
established in 2001 to partner with the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance
to develop and implement the Florida Deferred Presentment Program as a state regulatory
solution for the payday loan industry.‖ Veritec Solutions, About Veritec Solutions,
VERITECS.COM, http://www.veritecs.com/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). Veritec
Solutions, New Mexico Payday Loan Transaction System Welcome Package, N.M.
REGULATION
AND
LICENSING
DEP‘T,
http://rld.state.nm.us/FID/PDFs/
Veritec_Welcome_Package.pdf (last visited June 1, 2008). The database is a self-funding
project. The sole source of revenue for the database is a $0.50 charge on each payday loan
that is entered into the system. There is no charge for customer eligibility checks, Social
Security number validation checks, use of the Veritec help desk, transaction updates, or
report generation. In order to register and use the database, lenders must be licensed by the
New Mexico Financial Institutions Division to provide payday loans in New Mexico, they
must have registered their operators with Veritec, and those operators must complete the
Veritec training program and be certified by Veritec to use the system. Finally, as noted
above, the lenders must complete the upload of their historical data. Id.
111.
Florida
Vertics
information
available
at
http://www.vertics.com/PaydaySolution.aspx; Oklahoma Vertics information available at
http://www.vertics.com/Docs/OKapprovVerMar2004.pdf; Michigan Vertics information
available at http://www.vertics.com/Docs/MI_pres.pdf; Illinois Vertics information
available
at
http://www.veritecs.com/Docs/IL_3_Year_PLRA_Report.pdf;
North
Dakota,Vertics information
available at https://www.nddpp.com; Indiana Vertics
information available at https://www.indpp.com/about.asp. (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
.

2009]

PAYDAY LOAN PRACTICES

23

mechanisms for regulating the industry and for collecting information that could
give state officials the ability to continue to evaluate and improve these laws. One
of the most significant of these mechanisms appeared to be the Veritec database
system, which seemed to have the potential, over time, to show real statistics on
the average number of: (1) loans per borrower per year; (2) back-to-back or touchand-go112 loans issued; (3) loans converted to payment plans; and (4) loans that are
uncollectible, etc.113 The database, however, is not capturing the lion‘s share of the
short-term loan data in New Mexico.
Real data in these areas could have been very helpful in understanding
both the problems and the solutions associated with payday lending, yet none of
this potential will be realized in New Mexico, or in any other state that adopts a
similar regime to regulate payday lending. State legislators and consumer groups
all over the country still advocate using the Veritec database as a solution to shortterm loan abuses, but this is no solution if the industry can change its lending
model to avoid implicating the database. The database is little more than a costly
chimera if it will not capture the information it is designed to collect.
The New Mexico law, like many others around the country, capped
interest rates at a generous 417%, yet payday lenders regarded this as an
insufficient return. In order to reclaim the ―tremendous profits‖ 114 to which it had
become accustomed, the industry invented new products such as the payday loan
without the post-dated check and the installment loan described in the next
Section, which earn higher lender fees. One conclusion resonates strongly from
this game of legislative cat-and-mouse, namely that these types of legislative
efforts do not reduce short-term lending, interest rates, or fees for such loans.
While the payday lending industry itself claims that payday legislation
can effectively protect consumers,115 the industry‘s actions tell a different story.
The new products offered by short-term lenders suggest what the industry denies,
namely that the only type of regulation that really ends the abusive practice of
charging 500% or more in interest over long periods of time is an absolute interest
rate cap. Any other solution is subject to further end runs.

112.
Back-to-back or touch-and-go transactions allow a consumer to repay a
payday loan and immediately take out another loan for the same amount
113.
See 2009 New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Department
Financial Institutions Division Report, on file with the Author.
114.
See
HOW
TO
START
PAYDAY
LOAN
BUS.,
http://www.paydayloanindustry.com (last visited July 30, 2009).
115
See e.g. Brief of Amicus Curiae Community Financial Services Association of
America in Support of Petitioner, Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 126 U.S. 1204
(2005), (no. 04-1264), 2005 WL 1941281.
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B. Changes in the Short-Term Loan Industry
To say that the short-term loan industry is resilient, creative, and resistant
to piecemeal legislation is a tremendous understatement.116 The amount of
legislative time and effort the industry‘s shifting business plans have spawned is
nothing short of remarkable. The resulting maze of state and federal statutes is
complex, ineffective, and inefficient. While some scholars describe the payday
lending industry as one of the most highly-regulated industries in consumer
credit,117 it is strangely unaffected by the most intrusive legislation, such as that
recently passed in New Mexico. Such regulatory regimes are expensive because
they are time-consuming to pass and the resulting databases cost money to set up.
Moreover, they accomplish nothing.
1. The End Run Around New Mexico’s Small Loan Act and Similar Laws
in Other States
A look at the substitute products being offered by New Mexico‘s payday
lenders quickly reveals the legislative deficiencies. While some lenders in New
Mexico in the summer of 2009 were still offering payday loans with post-dated
checks, most were not. Many had stopped offering payday loans completely, and
were instead offering a product called an ―installment loan.‖ These loans are
outside the New Mexico payday lending statute because they are written for more
than the thirty-five days prescribed by the Small Loan Act. Many are written for
twenty weeks or five months, though it is unclear why this particular length was
chosen. These loans are completely unregulated, so lenders have carte blanche in
structuring them.
According to several of the customers interviewed curbside, some of the
lenders converted existing payday loans into installment loans without their
knowledge once the law changed. 118 Others continued to carry the old payday
loans since they were not affected by the new legislation. 119 Overall, this study
suggests that a very large portion of the market shifted to installment loans by
August 2009.120 Another product also popped up in place of the payday loan, the
payday loan without the post-dated check.121

116.
See Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 962 (2008).
117.
LEHMAN, supra note 12.
118.
See, e.g., interview with Study Participant CS66.
119.
One gentleman reported paying over $2000 over two years for a $300 loan.
This loan is still unpaid, and he does not understand why he still owes the original $300. See
interview with Study Participant CS27.
120.
See data from calls to lenders, gathered March 2009, June 2009, and
November 2009. The New Mexico payday lending industry is still in business, but it is
unclear whether even it is complying with the new law. In order to be in compliance with
the new law, the charge for a payday loan should be $15.50 per $100 borrowed, with a onetime $0.50 service fee. Examples of loan amounts we got from clerks over the phone or
from survey participants: (1) loans of $500 for $78, with $578 due by payday (1st Payday),
whether payday is tomorrow or two weeks from now; (2) $300 for $67.50 (Allied Cash and
FastBucks); and (3) $500 for $7 a day from now until payday (FastBucks), which appears to
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In June 2009, all listed payday and short-term lenders in Albuquerque
were contacted and informally surveyed to estimate what market share installment
loans had captured. Later in the fall, results were validated by random calls to onethird of the lenders originally contacted. More lenders offered payday loans in
March than in June, and by September, only one lender we contacted offered only
payday loans. While some lenders were offering both payday loans and installment
loans, most were pushing installment loans. 122
So how does an installment loan work? As one lender explained to a
customer, these installment loans have to be written for at least 120 days, but can
be ―paid off early so they can behave like a payday loan.‖ While the terms vary
somewhat, the following example demonstrates the general structure:
You borrow, for example, $500, and over the twenty week period,
you pay back this plus $585, for a total of $1,085. For another
example, you borrow $400 and you pay back that plus $468.20, for
a total of $868.20. The clerks are honest with people about the fact
that fees are higher with the installment (typically expressed as $25
per $100 versus $15.00 per $100). They also tell customers that the
customers have a better chance of paying back this type of loan.

Once a customer has repaid part of the principal on an installment loan, she is
encouraged to re-borrow the loan as quickly as possible. 123
Clerks explain to customers that if they choose an installment
loan rather than a payday loan, the customers can protect their
identity because their names and other data will not be placed in
the statewide database. Several clerks mentioned the ability to
avoid the database, and characterized this as a good thing to
protect one‘s identity and also to get more loans. One or two
clerks explicitly stated that if there was no database reporting,
there was no limit on the number of loans a customer could have.
One store prominently posted a huge sign outside
stating:ATTENTION: Come in and Get Your Money Today:
If You Have a Loan in Good Standing with Our Competitors,
compute to over 500% per annum. Thus, most lenders were in compliance with the fee caps,
but some were not.
121.
For example, Allied Cash Express appeared to be offering this product in
New Mexico during the summer of 2009.
122.
We found that by the summer of 2009, the new installment loans made up
well over half of the market that was previously known as the payday lending market in the
Albuquerque Metro area. This conclusion comes from calling lenders, not from information
gathered from customers. We asked survey respondents whether they were offered a payday
loan or an installment loans and they reported that they were offered: 53.75%, just
installment; 25.37%, both; 17.91%, only payday; 2.99%, unsure. Unfortunately these data
turned out to be questionable when we looked at the actual terms of individual loans. When
the data were analyzed more closely, it was clear that consumers simply could not reliably
tell the difference between the two, and thus it was ineffective to ask them which type of
loan they took out, a payday or an installment loan.
123.
See interview with Study Participants CS44, CS68.

26

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 52:3

Verifiable Employment and Residence – You Are Guaranteed a
Loan with World Finance.124
This sign suggests that at least for some lenders, multiple loans are part of the
solution rather than part of the problem.
The industry shift away from payday loans toward installment loans also
is causing confusion among customers. One woman reported that her family and
friends had bad experiences with payday and title loans, so she took out an
installment loan.125 Other customers described their loan as either a payday loan or
an installment loan, but when they told the interviewers when the loan was due and
how it would be paid back, it clearly was the other type of loan. 126 One man said
he thought he would get a payday loan but instead chose the installment loan. 127
His description of the terms indicated that he had a payday loan, suggesting that
these labels mean very little to the consumer. 128
a. The Payday Loan without the Post-Dated Check.
Since the New Mexico Act defines a payday loan as one involving a postdated check or a debit authorization, loans that exclude these elements but are
otherwise identical to a payday loan are currently unregulated in New Mexico. As
a result, a lender can make the same loan it made before and just not require the
post-dated check. Then it can charge whatever fees it wants; this transaction is
completely outside the statute. These are interest-only loans and many prohibit
pre-payment of partial principal, meaning that if the loan amount is high enough, it
virtually precludes paying off the loan without a family or friend bailout. People
using payday loans without post-dated checks are not entered in the state database,
making the database of very limited utility at this point. 129
While payday loans without post-dated checks did not seem to be the
industry loan product of choice in the summer of 2009, by the fall and winter,
these seemed to be more popular than the installment loans. Thus, interest-only
loans are again commonplace.
b. Some Customers Know about the Law and Know it Doesn‘t Work
While not every payday loan customer had heard about the modifications
to the law in New Mexico, a few offered information about the changes without
124.
Sign displayed at World Finance, 965 W Highway 550, Bernalillo, New
Mexico 87004-5924.
125.
See interview with Study Participant CS02.
126.
See, e.g., interviews with Study Participants CS13, CS54, CS60, CS68. A
study participant who was paying interest only on a payday loan without a post-dated check
said he did not choose the installment loan because he did not want to be in debt, apparently
not realizing that he was failing to pay down any of the principal on his loan. See interview
with Study Participant CS37. See also interview with Study Participant CS19 (explaining
that installment loans seem to cost more over time, but not understanding that he was not
paying anything on the principal on the payday loans.).
127.
See interview with Study Participant CS09.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. § 58-15-2(E).
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being asked or prompted. One customer articulately stated that ―the new laws are
not working. They try not to call it a payday loan but it is. The interest rates are
just as high. They have found a way to circumvent the law.‖ 130 Another said,
―Nothing changed with the new legislation.‖ 131
2. Similar End Runs in Other States
The new loan products described above are a complete end run around
New Mexico‘s payday lending statute and should be a wake-up call for other states
trying to curb abuses in this industry. Laws of this kind accomplish nothing, yet
are passed in various states around the country. For example, Professor Mayer
reports on similar Illinois legislation:
Regulators in Illinois imposed rules in 2001 that were designed to
[curb the number of simultaneous payday loans and rollovers].
Customers were allowed to borrow no more than $400; only two
renewals were permitted, with some of the principal paid down each
time; and a cooling-off period was mandated to prevent borrowers
from using the proceeds of a new loan to pay off the old one. The
state . . . promised to establish a database to track loan activity and
enforce the rules.132

Unfortunately, the Illinois case is a lesson in failed reform. The database
was never established133 and the payday lenders devised a new product to evade
the rules.134 The reforms applied to cash advances with a term of less than thirtyone days, so the industry created a thirty-one day loan not covered by the rules. As
a result, the old abuses persist: a 2003 Illinois Department of Finance report
acknowledges that it remains ―quite common for borrowers to have multiple
payday loans outstanding with several different payday loan companies.‖135
States other than New Mexico, such as Florida and Oklahoma, have
similarly tried to curb perpetual borrowing and lending practices by banning loan
renewals, as has proposed federal legislation, H.R. 1214. 136 But payday lenders
130.
See interview with Study Participant CS09; see also interview with Study
Participant CS67.
131.
See interview with Study Participants CS08, CS10.
132.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 8.
133.
Ironically, based upon New Mexico‘s experience, Illinois may have saved
itself some time and money by not setting up the database.
134.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 8 (quoting Tom Feltner & Marva Williams, New
Terms for Payday Loans: High Cost Lenders Change Loan Terms to Evade Illinois
Consumer Protections, 25 WOODSTOCK INST. 1, 3 (2004), available at
http://woodstockinst.org/document/alert_ 25.pdf).
135.
Id.
136.
Michael Calhoun, Payday Loan Reform Act Must be Strengthened, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (April 2, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mediacenter/press-releases/archives/payday-loan-reform-act-must-be-strengthened.html; but see
Veritec Solutions, Congressional Hearings Confirms That States Are Doing A Good Job At
Regulating
Short
Term
Lending,
PR
NEWSWIRE
(Apr.
4,
2009),
http://news.prnewswire.com/DisplayReleaseContent.aspx?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/sto
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quickly evade this restriction by closing out the current loan and replacing it with a
new, identical loan.137 This system results in no reduction in the average number
of loans per borrower or interest paid. 138
States such as Florida, Illinois, and Michigan139 have tried to impose
interest-free payment plans like those proposed in New Mexico. These laws have
produced no meaningful reduction in the number of trapped borrowers, because
the requirement that borrowers have only one loan at a time has no effect on the
revolving 400+% interest-only loans.140
Perhaps most critically, payday lenders can evade attempted reforms by
slightly modifying their products. For example, in Virginia, payday lenders have
ry/04-08-2009/0005002727&EDATE= lending (stating that ―‗[s]everal states, including
Florida and Oklahoma, are effectively protecting consumers,‘ said Thomas Reinheimer,
CEO of Veritec Solutions of Jacksonville, Florida. ‗Veritec is at the forefront of
implementing effective regulatory enforcement solutions for strong consumer protections
required by state law. We see first-hand the impact of good regulation in enabling access to
short-term credit while protecting consumers from getting trapped in a downward debtcycle.‘‖).
137.
Id.
138.
Veritec has published detailed white papers and reports about effective
regulation of the payday loan industry, which illustrate the following facts:
* Borrowers and lenders are unable to roll-over payday loans in Florida and Oklahoma.
* Over 75% of borrowers pay off their loans within two days after the due date.
* Grace periods and repayment plans are available under state law to any eligible borrower
who
cannot
pay
off
their
loans
on
time.
* Over 25% of borrowers no longer use the product more than one year and a majority of
borrowers no longer use the product after three years.
Could it be that Veritec does not read the industry‘s own weblogs? ―We are concerned
that states considering regulation and enforcement of consumer protections may be swayed
by misinformation from CRL. Veritec supports effective regulation of short-term lending
that provides borrower access to short-term credit products with enforcement of consumer
protections. State bans on short-term credit products often have an unintentional
consequence of helping eliminate a consumer‘s option to choose a regulated product,‖ said
Mr. Reinheimer. ―To better illustrate this, all anyone has to do is to search the Internet for
loans available in rate cap states and see that unregulated, unlicensed activity is alive and
well.‖ Veritec Solutions LLC is a regulatory services company that manages statewide
lender compliance programs in eight states with statewide databases and related limits
included in their respective payday lending (aka deferred presentment, deferred deposit)
statutes. Veritec helps state agencies regulate lenders through the management of these
programs. Veritec‘s primary customers are state regulatory agencies; the firm does not
supply any goods or services to the payday lending industry. Id.
139.
Florida‘s loan interest rates and fee caps actually amount to very large annual
percentage rates. The APR for a 14 day, $100 loan is 390%. Illinois‘ payday law caps the
fee that can be charged to $15.50 per each $100. This amounts to a very high effective APR.
The APR for a 14-day $100 loan is 403%. Michigan‘s legislation, the Deferred
Presentment Service Transactions Act limits loan amounts to $600 in a 31 day period and
allows lenders to charge up to 15% depending on the size of the loan. See ―State-by-State
Payday
Loan
Summary,‖
available
at
http://www.credit.com/credit_information/credit_law/PaydayLoanLaws.jsp (lat visited Aug.
17, 2010).
140.
Id.
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marketed open-end loans to avoid new regulations.141 In Illinois, as in New
Mexico, payday lenders changed their product to high-cost installment loans to
sidestep state laws targeted at the industry. 142 Ultimately, whenever payday
lending legislation passes, the industry finds a way to charge even more for loans
than they did prior to the legislation.
The new installment loans in New Mexico are not legislated at all, and in
practice lenders seem to be able to start the whole loan over and over again,
despite the name ―installment loan.‖ Numerous customers reported they were
never able to pay off any of the principal. 143 The data show that customers do not
understand the loan in these terms, but imagine if they did. Imagine how popular
these products would be if they were described as a loan for $400 that would
require a $62 payment every month for the rest of the borrower‘s life, after which
the borrower would still owe the original $400.144 Surely those who could would
find other alternatives.
3. Ways Around the 29% Absolute Cap: The Ohio Story
In 2008, the Ohio state legislature voted to rescind the twelve-year old
law that exempted payday lenders from the state‘s usury laws—a vote Ohioans
supported two to one. 145 The Short Term Loan Act purports to cap interest on all
141.
Jeff Schapiro, SCC Plugs Payday Loan Loophole, Richmond TimesDispatch, Jan. 1, 2010, available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/toolsresources/headlines/SCC-Plugs-Payday-Loan-Loophole.html.(last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
Shapiro reports that ―[p]ayday lenders started offering open-ended loans, which are treated
much like bank lines of credit, after Virginia lawmakers placed restrictions on the industry.
Legislators responded by passing a law requiring payday businesses to choose one product
or the other: payday loans or open-ended loans, but not both. However, that law included
language that enabled payday lenders to also offer car title loans and to continue hawking
both products. Consumer advocates say the SCC's corrective actions could help safeguard
consumers from being bogged down in debt.‖
142 .
Adam Doster, Momentum for Payday Loan Reform Growing” Progress
Illinois.,
Mar.19, 2010,
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/toolsresources/headlines/Momentum-for-Payday-Loan-Reform-Growing.html.( last visited Aug.
18, 2010). As Doster states: ―Illinois state Sen. Kim Lightford and 11 co-sponsors have
introduced SB 655, which would regulate small consumer installment loans (CILA) in the
state. It comes in an attempt to close a loophole in payday legislation passed by the General
Assembly in 2005. That law defined a payday loan to have a term of 120 days or fewer, so
the payday lending industry skirted the stipulation by turning to installment loans with
slightly longer repayment terms. Lightford's bill would limit interest rates on installment
loans at 99 percent APR, index loans based on a borrower's ability to pay, and require equal
monthly installment payment plans. A similar effort was defeated by House Democrats last
session.‖
143.
See, e.g., Interviews with Study Participants SB01, CS23, CS27, CS35,
CS44.
144.
This is the cost under New Mexico‘s new payday lending law. N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-15-32 to -38 (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Reg. & Spec. Sess., 49th Leg.).
145.
See Ballotpedia, Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate Cap, BALLOTPEDIA.COM,
ISSUE 5 (2008), http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/ Ohio_Payday_Loan_Referendum
Ohio Sub. H.B. 545, 127th General Assembly (As Passed by the General Assembly); see
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short-term loans at 28%, and also gives customers at least one month to pay off the
loans.146 In response, some payday loan operators chose to close their stores and
leave the state.147 Those that remained resorted to other innovative approaches. As
one industry website explains, these lenders are now prospering because there is
less competition, and creative tactics allow them to remain in business. They have
simply switched their licenses so they can offer payday ―clones‖ under two parallel
lending statutes, the Small Loan Act or the Mortgage Lending Act. 148 Ohio
Attorney General Rich Cordray said his office has found payday clones with
APR‘s ranging from 128 to 700%. As the same industry website explains, ―[T]here
is a lot of confusion in Ohio as a result of the attempt by fools to legislate away a
product that millions need, want, use and demand!‖ 149

also Creola Johnson, Dear President Obama: You Protected the Troops; Now Fulfill Your
Promise to Protect All Americans from Payday Loans, 12–14, (2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context =creola_johnson.
146.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39–.40 (West 2008).
147.
Mary Rice. ―Ohio HB 486 | Limiting payday lending fees‖ (May 11th, 2010)
stating ―After the first round of regulation was passed, more than 700 Ohio payday loan
stores closed.‖ Available at http://personalmoneystore.com/moneyblog/2010/05/11/ohiohb-486-payday-lending-fees/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
148. Ohio Payday Loans Laws & Legislation Developments, PAYDAY LOAN
LAWS, http://paydayloanlegislation.com/ohio.html (last visited Jul. 19, 2010). Making the
change is quite simple. As one industry website instructs:
By adjusting the loan amount to just above $500, payday loan lenders
double the loan origination fees from $15 to $30. The Small Loan and
Mortgage Lending acts allow the fees on top of the 28 percent interest,
something the new payday lending law doesn‘t permit.
Under the new HB545 licensing scheme with the check cashing fees
added, customers pay the same $575 to walk out the door with $500 in
cash. Prior to HB545, Lenders typically charged $15 for every $100
borrowed ….A First American payday loan customer indicated he
previously paid $75 for a $500 loan, First American charged him a total
of $90 to borrow the same amount after the law changed. More than one
Ohio payday loan company has structured their check cashing and loan
operations as two separate entities to justify the fees.
Id.
As another industry webpage explains:
With news of the passage of Issue 5 in Ohio on Nov. 4, Check Into Cash
began restructuring its loan product offerings throughout the Buckeye
state to comply with the new law. On Nov. 5, the company ceased to
offer payday loans and began offering a new product, micro loans,
which are short-term loans from $50 to $600 and permitted under
Ohio‘s Small Loan Act.
Check Into Cash Committed to Serving Ohio Customers – Repost, PAYDAYFACTS (Nov. 21,
2008, 10:19 AM), , http://www.paydayfacts.org .
149. PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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4. Credit Service Organizations and Payday Loans: The Next Face of
Hydra
Professor Mary Spector characterizes payday loans as the mythical beast
hydra, a nine-headed monster from Greek mythology that could grow a new head
every time one was cut off.150 The industry‘s newest incarnation makes the
analogy particularly apropos. Many states have statutes that govern entities called
Credit Service Organizations (CSOs). 151 CSO statutes were originally established
to control credit repair businesses, but in the past few years, short-term lenders
have been operating as CSOs under a statutory loophole that allows them to obtain
―an extension of consumer credit‖ for borrowers. The CSOs charge large fees in
exchange for purportedly helping consumers repair poor credit histories and gain
access to more credit.152 Most statutes define a CSO as:

150.
Spector, supra note 116, at 962, 964.
151.
Congress and numerous states have enacted Credit Service Organization
(CSO) legislation in an effort to crack down on abuses by companies claiming they could
help individuals repair their credit. Most of the credit repair agencies turned out to be scams
with some even offering to allow people to rent other people‘s credit scores for fees of
$2000 or more. To curb these abuses, states began enacting laws prohibiting agencies from
charging fees for these types of services, and thereafter, Congress followed suit with the
Credit Repair Organization Act. See Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1679-1679j (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). Many states have also passed CRO legislation.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.11(b) (West 2007). For additional state statutes, see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1701 to -1712 (West 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-101 to -109
(West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-14.5-101 to -113 (West 2007); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 36a-700 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2401–2414 (2007); D.C. CODE §§ 284601 to -4608 (2008); FLA. STAT. §§ 817.7001, .7005 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59
(2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/1–605/4 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 24-5-15-1 to -11 (2007) ;
IOWA CODE §§ 538A.1–.14 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1116 to -1135 (2006); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3573.1–.17 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 10-101 to -401 (2007);
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-1901 to -1916 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93,
§§ 68A–68E (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1821 to .1826 (2008); MINN. STAT.
§§ 332.52 to .60 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.635 to .644 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 30-14-2001 to -2015 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-801 to -815 (2007); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 598.741 to .787 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-D:1–11 (2008); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 458-a t6 -k (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-220 to -226
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4712.01 to .99 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 131–
148 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.380 to .398 (2006); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2181–
2192 (West 2007) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-7-101 to -122 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4718-1001 to -1011 (2007); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 393.001–.505 (West 2007); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 13-21-1 to -9 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-335.1–.12 (2008); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 19.134.010–.900 (2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6C-1 t6 -12 (2007); WIS. STAT.
§§ 422.501–.506 (2007). These states do not appear to have CSO statutes: Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming.
152.
Spector, supra note 116, at 988-89. See also “Payday Lenders in Arkansas:
Attorney General Cracks Down on PaydayLenders – Most Comply, Some Defy.” (July
2008)
page
7,
available
at
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/elements/www.paydayloaninfo.org/File/08_07_attorney_ge
neral.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
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[A] person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others,
sells, provides, or performs, or represents that he or she can or will
sell, provide or perform, any of the following services, in return for
the payment of money or other valuable consideration:
(1) Improving a buyer‘s credit record, history, or rating.
(2) Obtaining a loan or other extension of credit for a buyer.
(3) Providing advice or assistance to a buyer with regard to either
paragraph (1) or (2).153

The definition is extremely broad, opening the door for payday lenders to
redefine themselves as CSOs.154 Although CSO authorizing statutes provide
regulations for disclosure, registration, and operation of CSOs. CSO statutes do not
cap interest rates or fees, leaving the door wide open for payday lenders to slip into
the definition of a CSO and return to business as usual.155
Not surprisingly, the payday lending industry has done just that, as this
industry website announcement regarding the CSO loophole demonstrates:
If you‘re not familiar with the CSO payday loan model it
essentially consists of a ―servicer‖ that markets the product, services
the product, and accepts the risks associated with the product by
issuing a ―letter of credit‖ on behalf of the ―borrower‖ to a ―lender‖.
A Credit Services Organization typically charges the consumer $20–
$30 per $100 loaned for 7 to 31 days. The CSO Credit Services
Organization is ―registered‖ with the state rather than ―licensed‖ by
the state. The state does not ―regulate‖ the CSO.
....
The CSO Credit Services Organization model yields much better
returns than the typical payday loan-cash advance-deferred deposit
statutes existing in various states (Texas, Florida, Oregon…) and
provinces without all the licensing and regulation. It‘s no wonder

153.
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1789.12(a)(1)–(3) (West 2008).
154.
See Spector, supra note 116, at 987. On its face, the definition is extremely
broad, and California‘s statute, similar to statutes in Texas and other states, exempts several
categories of businesses, including licensed lenders, federally-insured banks, most
attorneys, and most tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. Nevertheless, the breadth of the
definition is apparent on first reading and, in some states, unless specifically exempted,
entities such as mortgage brokers are included within its terms. Increasingly, the line is
difficult to draw. For example, an Ohio court found that a company that advertised
―personal loans up to $50,000‖ for consumers with credit problems must comply with the
Act, but an Illinois court using the same definition held that a car dealership and a home
remodeling company, both of which arranged loans with third-party lenders, fell outside the
Act‘s scope. Id at 987–988 (citing Ohio ex rel. Petro v. Berks Fin., No. 03-CV-8373, 2004
WL 3736495, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 4, 2004); Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo,
Inc., 794 N.E.2d 843, 851–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (stating car dealership is not within the
scope of the Act); Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 1253–55
(Ill. 2003) (stating remodeling company is not within the scope of the Act).
155.
Spector, supra note 116, at 988.
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the use of the CSO Credit Services Organization model is on the rise
throughout the country.156

Since at least thirty-eight states have CSO statutes, payday lenders in any
of these states may try this approach. 157 CSOs are incredibly prolific in Texas,
following its recent regulation of payday loans. In 2005, there were fewer than 100
CSOs in Texas, but now there are more than 2000 CSO storefronts offering highcost small loans across the state. 158 Unlike other short-term or small-dollar lenders,
CSOs in Texas are not subject to any limitation on fees they can charge. 159 CSOs
also sidestep licensing and enforcement by the state‘s Office of Consumer Credit
Commissioner, which holds other Texas consumer lenders accountable.160 Texans
now take out an estimated $2.5 billion in loans through CSO payday lenders each
year and pay $500–$600 million in annual fees.161
Ironically, CSO legislation was originally enacted to protect consumers
from credit overextension and to help them make informed decisions about
credit.162 Now CSOs are being used to allow payday lending in states that have
prohibited it. The states that currently prohibit payday lending—Arkansas, New
York, New Jersey, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and most recently
New Hampshire—should keep their eye on CSO legislation. Such legislation
already exists in thirty-four states, including Arizona, Arkansas, New York, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia, Maine, and West Virginia.163 If these states
wish to continue their prohibitions on payday lending, they should repeal these
CSO statutes. Other states interested in curbing payday lending should follow suit.
5. State Law and Politics
One might wonder why so many legislative efforts to curb payday
lending fail, or more specifically, why none of the specific payday lending laws
actually change industry practices. The answer lies in part in the political process
itself.164 The $42 billion-a-year payday lending industry spent $6.1 million
156.
Florida Payday Loan Credit Services Organization Issues, PAYDAY LOAN
INDUSTRY BLOG (June 17, 2008), http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/florida-payday-loancredit-services-organization-issues.
157.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158.
Rebecca Lightsey, High Cost Lenders Profit from Desperate Times, TEXAS
LONE
STAR
FORUM
(Mar.
12,
2009,
1:06
PM),
http://amforumbacklog.blogspot.com/2009/03/high-cost-lenders-profit-from-desperate.html.
159
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 393.001–.505 (West 2007).
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
See Testimony of Uriah King, Center for Responsible Lending,
before the Ohio Financial Institutions, Real Estate, and Securities Committee,
September 30, 2009, 1, available at http://www.cohhio.org/pdf/Testimony
_of_Uriah_King_09-30-09.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
163.
See supra note 151
164. See Keith Epstein, Profiting From Recession: Lender Fight Big to Fight
Regulation, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/02/profiting-from-
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lobbying Washington last year alone.165 It has spent many more millions lobbying
in battlefield states like Wisconsin, Ohio, and Arizona. 166 With this kind of money
to spend, it is no wonder these forms of credit are difficult to regulate
effectively.167

III. RESULTS OF CURBSIDE AND OFFICE INTERVIEWS
Part III describes the methodology of our empirical study, as well as the
qualitative and quantitative results. All of the quantitative data described in this
Section are derived from the curbside interviews. The footnotes at times elaborate
on these quantitative data with comments made in the qualitative office interviews,
but the office interviews were not included in the percentage data analysis set out
below.
The curbside data demonstrate that customers do not shop around for
payday or other short-term loans, that customers tend to take out loans near home
or work out of convenience rather than pricing, that customers do not understand
the significance of the APR, that most payday customers are repeat customers, that
payday lending is far more convenient and less embarrassing than getting a loan
recession_n_482297.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
165.
Id. (stating that the industry paid campaign contributions in the amount of at
least $1,315,841 and incurred lobbying expenditures of at least $6,110,000 in 2009-2010).
166.
Trade groups have financed studies to underscore the small profit margin on
each loan. These groups have also created a database of more than half a million customers
who can be quickly mobilized to persuade particular politicians. The persuasion often takes
the form of personal, handwritten accounts from constituents about how quick cash helped
them during times of financial need. Id. Forms of these letters are left on the counter for
customers to pick up. See interview with Study Participant SB19. The industry spent more
than twice as much lobbying in 2009 as it did in 2008. The Community Financial Services
Association, one of many trade organizations of high-interest lenders, increased its spending
by 74%, to $2.56 million. Id.
Industry representatives claim to be tracking 178 different pieces of legislation around
the country—101 of which they oppose. In thirty-four states and Washington D.C., the
payday loan industry and its companies have forty of their own in-house lobbyists, while
paying another seventy-five outside lobbyists. An analysis of federal elections records
shows payday-linked political contributions are streaming into the campaigns of members
of Congress. At the current rate—$1.3 million since the start of 2010—the amount of
money spent before the 2010 midterm elections could easily surpass the industry‘s spending
during the 2007–2008 presidential campaign season. Id. Wright Andrews, whose lobbying
shop Butera & Andrews earned $4 million in fees for coordinating the subprime industry‘s
lobbying between 2002 and 2006, now represents the payday industry. Records show his
firm earned $240,000 from the Community Financial Services Association in 2009. Id.
167.
Payday lenders also contribute millions to candidates in state elections,
making them among the dozen or so top donors when figures for state and federal campaign
contributions are combined. That puts them in the same influential ballpark, for instance, as
unions, the gaming industry, and real estate interests. Id. In Wisconsin alone, efforts to
establish an interest rate ceiling of 36% mobilized at least twenty-seven registered lobbyists
against it. On February 16, 2010, Wisconsin lawmakers adopted a bill that could lead to
regulation of payday lenders for the first time, but not before rejecting the interest rate limit.
Id. In Arizona and Ohio, the industry spent $30 million in 2008 campaigning for ballot
initiatives that favor payday lenders; by contrast, reform groups reported spending only
$475,000. Id.
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from another source, and that the staff at many payday lending sites are friendly
and welcoming. The data also demonstrate that, while some payday lending
customers use the loans for the occasional emergency, most use them for regular,
recurring expenses or to pay off other payday loans.
The data also indicate that most customers cannot easily compare the cost
of this form of credit to other forms of credit; that most customers are unable to
accurately describe how much they will ultimately pay for the small sums they
borrow; that most customers generally feel they will be able to pay back the loans
they borrow in a short time, despite the fact that few ultimately can; and that once
a person has taken out one of these loans, it is harder to meet future ordinary
expenses.
A. Description of Empirical Study: Curbside Interviews
Beginning in spring 2009, after receiving funding from the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and obtaining Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval of the methodology, the IRB and the Author trained four University of
New Mexico students to conduct curbside interviews of payday lending customers
pursuant to the script set out in Appendix A. 168 While a much longer interview was
contemplated initially, the study methodology called for a cash payment of $10 in
exchange for each study participant‘s time. Given the small size of these payments,
a much shorter interview protocol was designed for the purpose of this initial
study. All participants were offered an opportunity to make general open-ended
comments of any kind at the end of the interview, and many chose to do so. Thus,
these curbside interviews gleaned both quantitative and qualitative data. 169
Students interviewed customers in groups of two, usually during the
lunch hour, from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m., and all day on Fridays. These were found to be
the busiest times of the week. The students stood outside payday lenders or sat in
their cars in the parking lot. They asked each customer who exited a store if she
had just obtained or was paying on a loan she took out within the past month. If the
answer was yes, the students asked the customer if she would like to take a ten
minute survey in exchange for a $10 gift card or $10 in cash. During the summer,
168.
Thereafter, one student was trained to enter study data and code such data.
The questions were initially written by the Author and colleague Erik Gerding and finetuned by a sociologist, Dr. Deborah Thorne. They were tested in the field before the actual
study began, and were reviewed and finalized at an empirical conference sponsored by
Harvard Law School and The University of Texas School of Law.
169.
The interviewing process itself started with a zip code and geographical
analysis, pursuant to which each lender‘s zip code was recorded and mapped. Students were
then given the zip code maps and asked to randomly visit payday stores within a particular
zip code until they had collectively visited all lenders within the zip code. Students were
instructed to sit outside each store for a stated period until they saw a customer to interview.
Students were not required to sit outside stores with no customers for more than thirty
minutes. At times customers were few and far between, particularly in relation to the
number of loan outlets. When more than one lender was visible from a particular parking
lot, the most fruitful approach was to park within viewing distance of several stores and
approach each customer when she left the store.
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the students also offered cold water to respondents. The response rate was 27.8%,
with 109 people who qualified accepting interviews out of 391 asked. Most of the
questions were open-ended to avoid suggesting an answer and to get as truthful a
response as possible from each study participant.
Though the original design contemplated interviews only with payday
lending customers who were getting their loan that day, it changed because there
were an insufficient number of subjects within that category. The vast majority of
the customers were paying on an existing loan, rather than taking out a new one,
consistent with the industry‘s business model. 170 Among those who were taking
out loans, many more (at least during the summer months), were getting
installment loans than payday loans. After attempting for several weeks with little
success to restrict survey data to customers obtaining a loan that day, the study was
expanded to include interviews of installment loan customers as well, and
eventually all customers who were either taking out or paying on a recent loan that
day.
Interviews were limited to the point of sale to generate better data than
phone interviews after the fact. This approach was adopted to avoid recall bias, 171
which causes people to forget events that occurred a long time ago.
B. Statistical Data
Some of the more interesting conclusions from the data are described
below.
1. Borrowers are Neither Infrequent nor Occasional and the Loans are
Far From Short-Term
To call this industry the ―short-term loan‖ industry is a misnomer. While
the industry repeatedly claims that most borrowers use short-term loans
infrequently, the data suggest otherwise. 172 In addition to the curbside interviews,
the Author conducted twenty one-hour, in-depth interviews. Most of the random
payday borrowers interviewed had been in continuous ―short-term‖ debt for over a
year, many on more than one loan. Some of this debt was structured as interest170.
In the beginning, when the students were only interviewing people who were
taking out new loans, they could go several days without identifying a customer who was
taking out a new loan.
171.
ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 16, at 60. Recall bias is likely to
have entered into the interviews conducted by Elliehausen and Lawrence, in which the
investigators called the customers of several large payday lenders to discuss loans taken out
over the past year. Studies suffering from recall bias create less reliable data than those not
burdened with recall bias. Eman Hassan, Recall Bias Can be a Threat to Retrospective and
Prospective Research Designs, INTERNET J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Feb. 13, 2009, 1:24 PM)
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ije/vol3n2/bias.xml. Francis
W. Horvath, Forgotten Unemployment: Recall Bias in Retrospective Data, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Mar. 1982, at 40–43.
172.
Since the frequency of these products has already been well documented, this
was not a focus of our study. Nevertheless, customers were allowed to make any comments
they liked at the end of the interview and some commented on having used the same lender
for years. See, e.g., interview with Study Participant CS45.
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only debt that did not permit the borrower to make even partial payments on the
principal owed.173 The never-ending, interest-only nature of the debt is evident in
the loyalty programs offered by some payday lenders: after a certain number of
timely interest payments, customers can get a discount on the next interest
payment.174 None of these payments pay off any of the principal, however. 175
Nor do customers use these loans only occasionally. A significant number
of subjects had used multiple payday loans or direct deposit advances from
multiple lenders for a period of years, including some from traditional banks like
Wells Fargo and US Bank.176 These banks offer payday advances that can be
rolled over for about a year and then must be paid off for about a month before the
customer can resume using them for another year. 177 When it became apparent that
interviewees were just rolling these direct deposit advance loans indefinitely, the
Author asked one customer what she did if she could not use one of these loans in
a given month. That, she explained, ―is when you go to one of these other loan
companies.‖178
If states wish to regulate payday lending, and the industry claims use of
such loans is infrequent, states should consider requesting evidence to support
these claims of infrequent use. The short-term loan industry has access to data
showing how frequently customers use these loans. Such data, available through
Veritec, TeleTrack, or other credit-checking methods used by the industry, could
be very useful to states, if the industry made it available.

173.
Interview with Study Participants CB34, SB01, SB12, SB13.
174.
Interview with Study Participant SB01. Copy of loyalty card on file with the
Author.
175.
See Allied Cash Advance loyalty card for interest-only loan, on file with the
Author.
176.
See interview with Study Participant SB01.
177.
As the Wells Fargo website explains:
You may take advances (in $20 increments) as often as you like—up to your available
credit limit. This Service is designed to provide access to cash on a short-term basis when
you may need it most. If you use the Service for more than 12 consecutive statement
periods, your credit limit will be gradually reduced by $100 in future statement periods until
your credit limit is zero or you do not use the Service for one statement period. (A statement
period is approximately a month—your exact statement cycle dates can be found on your
monthly statement.) For example, assume your calculated advance limit is $500 and you
have used the Direct Deposit Advance service in each of the last 12 consecutive statement
periods. In the 13th statement period, your advance limit will be $400 ($500 less $100). If
you continue to use the service your advance limit in the 14th statement period will be $300.
If you continue to use the service thereafter, your advance limit will continue to decrease by
$100 each consecutive statement period until it equals $0 for one statement period. You can
avoid this reduction in your standard credit limit if you do not take a new advance for 1
complete statement period at any time. Your current advance limit appears in the Direct
Deposit Advance section of your monthly checking account statement.
Direct
Deposit
Advance
Service
Questions,
WELLS
FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/help/faqs/dda_faqs (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
178.
See interview with Study Participant SB01.
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2. Many Customers Do Not Understand How the Interest-Only Loans
Work
There is a marked lack of transparency, not to mention understanding,
about how the interest-only loans work. Several customers explained that the
clerks did not tell them that the minimum fees do not pay down the principal
amount of the loan before they took out the loan.179 Many customers ultimately
figure out that the loan is interest-only, but some do not. Another customer
reported hearing an elderly woman in one payday lending store arguing
vehemently that there was no way the math could possibly work out the way the
clerk said—it was just not right. The customer being interviewed knew what the
confusion was because she had also misunderstood the way the loans were
structured, at least at first.180 Another customer said he chose a payday loan instead
of an installment loan because he did not want to be in debt, yet he was not paying
down the loan.181 As another customer explained, ―The lender never explained that
I could pay down the loan by paying more than the minimum. Unless you pay
more than the minimum, the loan amount never goes down.‖ 182 Yet another said
that the clerks did not inform him of the terms of the loan until he took it out.183
One reported that the ―paperwork is usually handed to the customer in a sealed
envelope, so you won‘t read it.‖184
Some customers still did not understand the terms of their loan, even after
paying on it for some time. One man had paid more than $2000 on a $300 loan and
did not know why he had not made a ―dent in the loan.‖ 185 The loan amount, he
explained, never went down. This person came in with two other family members.
One of them, his daughter, commented that the interest was too high and that the
loan principal would not decrease with the payments.186 The third family member
in the group said that ―the way they apply the payments, it just doesn‘t add up.‖ 187
A failure to understand the interest-only nature of the loans showed up in other
areas as well, including the common misunderstanding about how payday loans
differ from installment loans.

179.
See interview with Study Participant CS32; see also interview with Study
Participant CS23 (stating that ―they did not tell me I could pay down the debt by paying
more than the minimum, and unless you do that, the whole payment goes to fees‖).
180.
See interview with Study Participant SB01.
181.
See interview with Study Participant CB37.
182.
See interview with Study Participant CS28.
183.
See interview with Study Participant CS32.
184.
See interview with Study Participant SB12.
185.
See interview with Study Participant CS27.
186 .
See interview with Study Participant CS25.
187.
See interview with Study Participant CS26. This same person reported that
payday loans are cheaper than credit cards, an issue taken up in Part III.B.4, infra.
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3. Most Borrowers Are Unable to Describe the APR on Loans, and
Cannot Predict the Total Dollar Cost of the Loans to Them
a. Complete APR Disconnect
Few of the respondents said they could confidently state the APR on their
own loans without looking at the top right corner of their loan documents. Almost
60% of those asked said they did not know what the APR was and that they were
not willing to wager a guess of what the APR might be. Of those that said they
knew or would guess, the rates described varied widely. They ranged from 0.05%
per annum to 586% per annum. Of those who were willing to attempt to state the
APR, 39% thought the APR was in the double-digit range of 18% to 96%, despite
the fact that the actual annual percentage interest rates on almost all loans was
between 417% and 587 % per annum. 188

Interviewees were almost universally unable to specifically state the APR,
even in general terms, unless they were holding the loan paperwork in their
hands.189 Moreover, the acronym itself meant nothing to them. Many people
generally seemed not to know what the APR was for, or what it stood for or
represented. Even when interviewers told the interviewees that the term meant

188.
A few lenders in this market, typically local rather than national lenders, did
give loans at around 100%. We were familiar with these lenders and considered 100% a
correct answer when borrowers borrowed from them.
189.
APR GUESS DATA
> 500%
7.93%
301-499%
7.63%
101-300%
9.76%
1-100%
15.96%
Don‘t Know/Didn‘t Guess
58.72%
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annual percentage rate, or interest rate, many interviewees could not articulate
what the rate represented.190
The industry has long argued that requiring the loan to be stated in terms
of APR is a waste of time because people do not borrow the money for a full year.
Many times, however, people do borrow the money for a year or more.
Nevertheless, disclosing the APR is of little value to most consumers, though it
does help legislators to understand the cost compared to other credit. So why is the
industry opposed to disclosing the cost of their short-term loans in terms of APR?
Because the APR makes the loans appear very expensive when in reality, claims
the industry, the loans are short-term and infrequently used by particular
consumers.191 Moreover, paying $15 to borrow a much-needed $100 once in a
great while is well worth it, according to the industry.
If only this were reality. Numerous studies have shown that a large
number of payday loan customers rollover the principal again and again.192
Customers pay numerous fees for a single cash advance, which means that many
of the loans are not truly ―short-term.‖ The Indiana Department of Financial
Institutions revealed in 1999 that ―91% of customers in the state rolled over their
loans; the average number of renewals was ten.‖193 Even the industry-funded
Elliehausen and Lawrence study found that 75% of a national sample renewed the
loans at least once and more than 39% rolled over the loans five or more times. 194
According to a 2001 report of the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions,
more than half of the loans it reviewed were rolled over; 38% of customers
renewed their loans more than three times. 195 ―Other studies show that the bulk of
revenue and profits for payday loan outlets is derived from ―churning‖ or back-toback loans.‖196 More than one study found that at least one-third of payday loan
customers reported using the proceeds of one loan to pay off another loan at a
different outlet.197 Data from the study reported on in this Article suggest that this
figure is a gross underestimate.
190.
This is, of course, not unique to payday customers; as many other people also
cannot articulate what an APR means.
191.
See, Arkansas against Abusive Lending, ―How to Calculate the Interest Rate
on
Payday
Loans,‖
available
at
http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/
pdfs2/aaapl_howtocal.pdf) (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
192.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 3.
193.
Id.
194.
See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 16, at 39.
195.
Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions. Review of Payday Lending
in Madison Wisconsin (2001)10
196.
Mayer, supra note 29, at 3.
197.
Stegman & Faris, supra, note 14, at 20. Other studies offer anecdotal
evidence about debtors borrowing multiple times against the same paycheck. The state OFI
reports note that the average payday advance customer takes out a dozen loans a year, and
not all of these loans are sequential. A team of researchers in Ohio went on a spree to see
whether they could borrow from several different stores in a few days. One individual was
granted nine loans in three days, even though the creditors used the TeleTrack system.
Johnson, supra note 14, at 63. Other horror stories have been reported in the media—debtors
carrying more than a dozen loans at once—but there has been no attempt thus far to
determine how common that practice is. As we shall see below, the practice is in fact quite
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b. Difficulty Understanding the Total Dollar Cost of the Loans
A number of our study questions sought and obtained information about
customers‘ understanding of the dollar costs of their loans, particularly questions
L1 through L8.198 Respondents were first asked to describe in detail how much
they borrowed and when and how they were expected to pay the money back.
Thereafter, they were asked to describe their understanding of the total amount
they would pay in interest and fees in addition to the principal.
The first data set described here contains each customer‘s understanding
of the fundamental terms of her loan, meaning how much each borrowed, when the
loan was to be paid back, and at what total dollar cost. Of the participants, 19%
declined to attempt to describe the dollar costs of their loan, meaning that rather
than describe the total interest and fees for the loan in dollar terms they replied
with ―not sure,‖ ―not sure, it‘s high,‖ ―at least the amount of the loan,‖ ―not real
clear, a lot,‖ ―tricky, not sure,‖ or ―not sure, they tell you but it seems like a lot
more.‖ This was surprising because it appeared likely to us that, while people
might not be able to articulate the APR, they probably would understand the shortterm cost of the loan, and perhaps even the long-term cost of the loan.
Because we knew that most businesses that were interviewed charged
between $15 and $25 per $100 to borrow a payday loan, any time a person said
they were paying a fee in that range (to be paid back in a period of fourteen days or
less) we counted that person as one who described dollar costs that seemed facially
consistent with the terms of the loan. Because we knew that a typical twenty-week
installment loan costs just over double the loan amount, we counted as facially
consistent with the terms of the loan borrowers who described a loan to be paid
over time and as anything at or over the loan amount. Thus, if a person described
an installment loan‘s total fees as anything at or over the loan amount, we counted
that person as one who described dollar costs that seemed facially consistent with
the terms of the loan.
Of those who attempted to describe the short-term dollar cost of their
loan, 59% (or fifty-two people) described short-term dollar costs that were facially
common. Every weekday in Milwaukee County an average of three or four residents file for
bankruptcy owing debts to several different payday lenders. Bankruptcy court is a good
place to look for payday loan customers because they are four times more likely to have
filed for bankruptcy in the past than the average adult. See Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra
note 16, at 46.
198.
These questions are:
L1—How much cash did you take away/borrow (in dollars)?
L2—How many days before you are expected to pay it back?
L4—Do you expect to be able to pay it back within this time frame?
L3—Do you know how much you can expect to pay in fees and/or interest?
L5—Do you know about how much the loan would cost if you needed to keep it out
(not pay back what you borrowed) for a month? For example, do you know the total amount
you would be charged in fees and extra charges?
L6—Do you know about how much the loan would cost if you needed to keep it out
(not pay back what you borrowed) for about a year? For example, do you know the total
amount you would be charged in fees and extra costs?
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consistent with the terms of the loan described by the customer or the in-hand
paperwork, and/or what we knew about the terms from our own inquiries to the
stores.199 This left 41% (or thirty-six people) that described fundamental loans
terms that were inconsistent with the price being charged, based on what we knew
about the lender from calling, from in-hand paperwork, and/or from other
customers exiting the same store. Overall, that means that just over half of the
respondents seemed to understand the fundamental terms or overall cost of their
loan even in the short term.
Question L5 asks, ―Do you know about how much the loan would cost if
you needed to keep it out (not pay back what you borrowed) for a month? For
example, do you know the total amount you would be charged in fees and extra
charges? If so, how much?‖ Participants were asked to give a dollar figure as the
extra monthly cost. Forty-nine of 109 (44.9%) declined to give a dollar figure,
simply answering ―no‖ or ―I don‘t know.‖ Another five gave non-responsive
answers such as ―pay off and re-borrow,‖ ―22–26%,‖ ―an extra 10–15%,‖ ―renew
loan,‖ and ―same interest rate.‖ Two said they did not believe they could not keep
the loan out an extra month because ―it would go to collections,‖ or that that they
did not think they could because ―they automatically debit my account after a fiveday grace period.‖ The remaining sixty respondents attempted to do the math.
Answering this question required study participants to calculate the
monthly interest payments by doubling the two-week fee for a payday-style loan or
by dividing the total fees by the number of months over which an installment loan
was to be paid. To analyze the answers to this question, we simply assumed for
this question only that whatever terms the customer described as their loan
arrangements were accurate and used the question to measure math capabilities.
For payday loans, the exercise was not too difficult as it simply involved doubling
the two-week fee. For installment loans, the math was harder to calculate, but not
impossible.200 We attempted to give the benefit of the doubt to a customer whose
answer made a reasonable degree of math sense. 201

199.
For example, someone borrowed $100 for seven days and said the fees were
$25 at a place that we understood to be charging $25 to borrow $100 between now and
payday. See interview with Study Participant CS07. Someone else in this family of
establishments was borrowing $200 for two weeks for $50 in fees. See interview with Study
Participant CS22. Another described the fees and costs as $20 to borrow $100 until payday,
which we considered close enough to constitute a decent understanding of the initial costs
of the loan. See interview with Study Participant CS01.
200.
Again, to answer this question correctly, the customer would need to divide
the total fee for the loan by the number of months over which the loan was to be paid.
201.
For example, if a customer said that they were borrowing $250 for fourteen
weeks for total fees of $275, then the actual additional cost of keeping the loan out for one
month extra would likely be about $78. If the customer said that this would cost about
$100, this was a rational answer in our eyes. On the other hand, if a customer said that a
$100 loan was due back in two weeks and that the fees on that loan would be $20, we would
expect the extra month to cost $40. If the person said $20 for the month, this was counted as
a calculation that showed a lack of math aptitude. See interview with Study Participant
CS01. In the case of CS17, the customer had a two-week loan that cost $37, but said that a
one-month loan was $64. We counted this as one in which the customer had reasonable
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Of the sixty who attempted the math, twenty-nine answered in ways that
were inconsistent with the numbers described by them in the prior question. That
left thirty-one that answered in a way that came close to what the actual cost of
that extra month of credit might be. 202 That meant that at most, thirty-one out of
109 interviewees (or 28.4% of those interviewed) were able to calculate the added
cost of keeping this credit out for an additional month. Put another way, less than
one-third of those interviewed knew what the monthly cost of the credit was.
Previous studies show that most payday borrowers do not pay back their
payday or installment loans after one loan cycle, but rather borrow the money
again and again, paying mostly fees and no principal for over a year or longer. For
that reason we also sought to determine if payday and installment loan customers
knew the cost of keeping the loans out for this longer period of time. Thus,
question L6 asked, ―Do you know about how much the loan would cost if you
needed to keep it out (not pay back what you borrowed) for about a year? For
example, do you know the total amount you would be charged in fees and extra
costs? How much?‖
At this point, only twenty-four of 109 (or 22%) were willing to even try
to quantify the dollar cost of keeping the loan out for a full year. Of the twentyfour, ten gave figures that were consistent with the other answers given on the total
costs of the loan. The other fourteen gave answers that were implausible based
upon the other information we gleaned. This means that less than 10% of the
customers we interviewed could estimate the cost of this credit over a year period,
even though many probably kept their loans out for a year or more.
This lack of ability to understand should not necessarily be blamed on the
customers. In many cases, the paperwork could hardly be more confusing. 203
Lenders are no doubt aware that customers do not and perhaps cannot, do this
math. As one customer explained, ―I don‘t like math, and I don‘t want to try to
calculate [these things].‖ Another rather unsurprising reason why customers are
unable to calculate the cost of this credit is that many are hopelessly optimistic in
terms of when they expected to be able to repay the loan, particularly at the
beginning of the relationship. One customer explained that she did not realize that
it would be so hard to pay her loan back. She had become a hair stylist and needed
money to establish clientele while still meeting her other bills and obligations. She
quickly found, however, that the payday loan made it harder to fulfill those

math aptitude, even though there is a $10 math error. It seemed the person knew what she
was doing but just made a mistake. The same mistake was made in the reverse by no. CS22.
202.
Interestingly, a number of the borrowers described the loan as costing $20 to
borrow $100. Stated in those terms, these loans sound reasonable even though this amounts
to 730% per annum.
203.
For example, for one loan the interview team was unable to find any APR
disclosure on any of the in-hand paperwork. Confusingly, the cover page disclosed the
original loan amount as $3612.07, even though the customer took away just $1000. The
second page of the paperwork analyzed the payments in virtually incomprehensible terms,
but essentially showed payments of $3212.07 to borrow $1000 for seven months.
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obligations.204 Many others reported thinking they would be able to pay back the
loans much more quickly than they actually could. 205
4. Hear No Evil, See No Evil: Customers Cannot Compare the Cost of
Alternative Credit Sources and Do Not Understand the Cost of Credit
Cards versus Payday Loans
Survey data reveal that some consumers misperceive the cost of credit
cards in comparison to payday loans. Thirty-three of 109 customers (or 30%)
reported having credit cards. Of the thirty-three, seventeen reported that their
credit card or cards were maxed out. 206 Of those surveyed with credit cards, 15%
said they would not use the credit card at this time because credit cards are for
emergencies only.207 This seems to contradict the notion that payday loans are also
for emergencies only. Another customer said credit cards should be used only
when one is trying to build a credit history. 208 Yet another said he did not want to
get into the habit of using credit cards.209
The idea that credit cards should be used more sparingly than payday or
installment loans also suggests that people think it is somehow less expensive or
safer to use a payday loan than a credit card. Many of the comments above suggest
that people do not know that credit card interest is typically five to twenty times
(or more) less expensive than payday loan fees.210 More to the point, in addition to
those mentioned above, at least five of the sixteen respondents stated outright that
the interest paid on a credit card is higher or more expensive than the fees for a
payday loan.211 As one man explained, ―Credit cards are worse [than payday
loans]. You could lose your job. $1000 becomes $5000 overnight.‖ 212 Another

204.
See interview with Study Participant CS43.
205.
See interview with Study Participants CS59, CS60, CS69, CS78. No. CS69
was celebrating the day we interviewed her. She had been in the loan for months and was
making her last payment. See interview with Study Participant CS69.
206.
See interview with Study Participants CS11, CS21, CS35, CS55, CS59,
CS62, CS71, CS81, CS82, CS85, CS92, CS93, CS98, CS99, CS102, CS105. Another
customer said she did not know she could get a cash advance from a credit card and that she
needed cash. See interview with Study Participant CS18.
207.
For example people said things like ―credit cards are strictly for
emergencies;‖ ―[my credit card] is in a safe deposit box locked away so I cannot use it;‖ ―I
need my credit card for emergencies;‖ and ―I had credit card problems when I was younger,
so now I use [it] only for emergencies.‖ See interviews with Study Participants CS05, CS34,
CS36, CS49, CS53, CS66.
208.
See interview with Study Participant CS39.
209.
See interview with Study Participant CS64. Again, typical APRs in this
market were 100% (two lenders that we know of and visited) to 586% (many of the
installment loan establishments).
210.
See interview with Study Participants CS06 (stating that she had no credit
cards because she was ―afraid of accumulating debt‖), CS25 (same), CS45 (stating that
―credit cards cost more than payday loans‖), CS26 (stating that credit cards cost two times
the interest of payday loans), CS93 (credit cards are ―too expensive‖), CS98 (interest rates
are ―too high to take out cash on a credit card‖).
211.
See interview with Study Participants CS33, CS74, CS85, CS93, CS98.
212.
See interview with Study Participant CS36.
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explicitly stated that ―interest is cheaper at the payday lender than it is on the credit
card.‖213 All totaled, it appears that more than half of the customers surveyed who
had credit cards thought credit cards were more expensive to use than payday
loans.214 Even some customers who did not have a credit card reported without
prompting that credit cards were more dangerous because they grant more freedom
to spend without limits. 215 Yet payday loans did not cause similar alarm to these
customers. As one said in response to the question about why she took out a
payday loan instead of a using a credit card, ―no reason, impulse.‖ 216
As described above, the majority of people also thought APR for a
payday loan was a single- or double-digit number, suggesting that when consumers
hear that they are being lent money at $15 or $20 per $100, even over a two-week
period or less, they may equate this with 15% or 20% per annum. This may appear
cheaper than the average 25% many credit-challenged people pay on their credit
card balances.217
According to Professor Christopher Petersen, American states
traditionally had single-digit usury limits, which ultimately inched up into the
double-digits, until usury laws were largely abandoned following the 1978
Supreme Court decision in Marquette.218 Professor Peterson explains that
consumers have grown used to seeing certain numbers affiliated with the cost of
credit and are likely to make certain assumptions about what those numbers mean.
More specifically, consumers are accustomed to double-digit interest rates, and
cannot rationally imagine a rate that is in the triple digits. As Professor Petersen
explains:
Salience distortion is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between the annual percentage rate of a usury statute‘s most
expensive permissible loan and the most prominent, or salient,
number written in the statutory language limiting the price of the
loan . . . . Because currency is numerical, in any statute that caps the
price of a loan, the legislature must at some point pick a number or
numbers. While this is true of every usury law, the specific number
a legislature chooses only has meaning in relation to other variables
associated with the law in question.219

213.
See interview with Study Participant CS33.
214.
See, e.g., interview with Study Participant CS98. This is no secret to the
payday lending industry. See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 16, at 37.
215.
See interview with Study Participant CS15 (stating that ―credit cards are
worse because they grant more freedom to spend without realizing‖).
216.
See interview with Study Participant CS40.
217.
See
CreditCards.com's
Weekly
Rate
Report,
available
at
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/interest-rate-report-aprs-record-highs1276.php. ( last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
218.
Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp, 439 U.S.
299 (1978); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110,
1117–22 (2008).
219.
Id. at 1136.
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As Professor Petersen explains, one legislature might adopt a usury limit
of 8% per year while another might adopt a cap of 8% per month, and, while both
would have chosen to feature the same number in the language of the statute, the
latter cap would be twelve times higher than the former because there are twelve
months per year. A legislature could even adopt an interest rate cap of 8% per
century—which would create a price cap much lower than either the monthly or
annual cap. To continue the point, ―a legislature could adopt a cap of 8% per
second, which would generate an extremely high price limit.‖ 220 In other words, if
it chose to do so, any legislature could pick a small number and create a relatively
high price limit or, instead, pick a large number and create a relatively low price
limit. Legislatures can feature whatever number they want in a usury law.221
This might explain why consumers think that a 417% payday loan,
described at costing $15 per $100 borrowed sounds less expensive than an annual
percentage rate of 25% on a credit card. People in this study actually seemed
scared of credit card debt, and one woman claimed that at least with a payday loan
she knew what she would be paying. With credit cards, she explained, ―you have
no idea what it‘ll ultimately cost and there is no one to talk to.‖ 222 Student
interviewers wondered if the media also frightens people away from credit cards
with constant television ads for specialists offering to help debtors out of those
credit card messes. No one working on this project could ever remember anyone
on television talking about how to get out from under a rash of payday loans.
5. Loans are Used Primarily for Recurring Expenses, not for Unexpected
Emergencies
The majority of participants—indeed, 63%— reported using payday loans
for regular, recurring monthly bills and expenses. 223

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Interview with Study Participant CS45.

Dot Chart: Study Participant’s Percent
Responses When Asked What They
Wanted Loan For
Regular bills (phone,
electric, mortgage, rent)
No Answer
Personal expenses
Auto expenses
Help family
Medical expenses
Emergency Expenses
Just to have cash
Party
Gambling
School expenses















Key: 10s 
1s: 

63.27
5.08
5.25
4.88
4.88
4.73
3.56
2.49
2.24
1.58
1.32
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Initially, these respondents stated that the money was to cover “bills,” but later
elaborated that they meant rent, utilities, gas bills, cell phone bills, and so on. This
category of usage consists of ongoing expenses, nothing out of the ordinary like a
broken car or medical emergency. These data are inconsistent with the 2001
Elliehausen and Lawrence industry-sponsored study, which concludes that nearly
half (47.2%) of most recent loans were used to pay an unexpected expense, a third
for discretionary uses, and just twelve percent for regular expenses.”224
6. Borrowers Choose This Form of Credit Over Cheaper Forms, Because
It is Convenient and Available Anywhere, Anytime
As other studies have found, convenience drew consumers in our study to
a particular payday lender.225 Unlike qualifying for other forms of credit,
qualifying for money is easy and fast—just as the advertisements say—without the
stigma of admitting to friends, family, or a financial institution that the customer is
broke.226 Moreover, many payday loan consumers do not trust mainstream
financial institutions.227 Our participants also noted the friendliness of the clerks in
payday lending stores as a reason why they opted for that form of credit.228
Frankly, we noticed the same thing ourselves when calling around about rates and
plans. The lenders train their employees to be friendly to customers.229 The
extended hours of payday lenders were also a big draw in our study. 230 And—as
expected—location, location, location, is an important factor.231

224.
See Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 16, at 47. Similar to the industry
study, another study conducted by Environics Research Group on behalf of the Canadian
Association of Community Financial Service Providers reports that 92% of payday
customers used their loans for an immediate cash-flow crisis and 4% for immediate
consumption. See ENVIRONICS RESEARCH GROUP, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMERS OF
CANADA‘S PAYDAY LOANS INDUSTRY 18 (2005), available at http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/PaydayLoansReportPresentationJune9.ppt (last visited Aug. 18,
2010).
225.
Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of
Debt?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 669 (2008).
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
See interview with Study Participant CS28.
229.
Kenneth, supra note 225, at 669. Professor Kenneth reports on a focus group
study in California of low-income and ethnic consumers, which identified five ways in
which fringe banks, like check-cashers, are superior to mainstream banks: easier access to
cash; accessible locations; better treatment of customers; greater trustworthiness; and better
service because of the many useful products in one location, better hours, and more
Spanish-speaking employees. Id.
230.
Id.
231.
ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 16, at 52.
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7. Customers Do Not Pursue Lower-Cost Credit Because These Loan Outlets are
Ubiquitous and Convenient232

One of the common criticisms of payday and similar loan establishments
is that they are too available for consumers, and thus cause customers to choose
payday loans instead of cheaper or no-cost alternatives. As these outlets have
become more ubiquitous and convenient, consumers make payday lenders their
first choice of finance more frequently. One study participant tells a particularly
perilous story. She was pleased with herself for not taking out any student loans,
yet she was at a payday lender, borrowing money. 233 She was accompanied by her
mother who had given her the advice to avoid student loans, even though student
loans can be obtained for between 0% and 8.5% APR.234 This is not an isolated
example of people choosing high-cost credit over low-cost credit. Another
example is the use of payday loans rather than credit cards discussed in Part III.B.4
above. A large percentage of study participants could have either chosen cheaper
credit or foregone the payday loan entirely. Participants were asked what they
would have done if they had not been able to get a payday loan. Nearly 43% said
they would have asked a friend or family member for the money, a classic no-cost
option.235 A few said they would use a bank, which would clearly be cheaper, and

232.
Why Customers Choose Payday Storefronts Over Lower
Cost Credit Options
Answers
Percent Responding
Convenient Location
41.36%
Trusted recommendation
19.54%
Less screening/passed screening
9.72%
Left Blank
6.83%
Competitive rates or specials
6.82%
Happenstance
5.91%
Returning user
3.97%
Last resort
2.94%
Advertisement
1.94%
Convenient business
0.97%
233
See interview with Study Participant CS63.
234.
See interview with Study Participant CS62.
235.
See interview with Study Participants CS61, CS62, CS65, CS72, CS109, and
many others.
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two said they would go to a pawn shop.236 One gentleman got a loan from a bank
once and then later returned to the payday lender. 237 Another initially wanted to
avoid borrowing from family, but now had to borrow from a family member just to
make ―this installment.‖238
Another 13.4% of interviewees said they would use another low- or nocost alternative such as waiting until payday, 239 not having the party they were
planning,240 not going to the casino that day,241 not getting dental work done
now,242 working overtime,243 walking for a week until they could afford a car
repair or gas,244 going to a credit bureau and entering into a repayment plan, 245
calling the utility company to delay payment of their bill,246 or working out a deal
with the cell phone company.247 This means more than half of the people asked
could have refrained from taking out a payday loan, suffered little or no negative
consequence, and saved themselves money.
Of course, some of these alternative sources of cash may be unpalatable
for other reasons. For example, loans from family members might be accompanied
by an unwelcome inquiry as to how the money is to be used or a lecture on
financial prudence.248 Nevertheless, as set out above, most customers do not seem
to understand the cost of this high-cost, short-term debt, in dollar terms or
otherwise. Thus they are generally unable to compare the personal cost 249 of the
lecture or invasion of privacy by the relative or friend to the dollar cost of the loan.
If they were able to calculate these dollar costs, they might well decide that
avoiding the loan was worth the lecture. Moreover, if payday and installment loans
236.
See interview with Study Participants CS9, CS36, CS7, CS26, and CS67.
237.
See interview with Study Participant CS90.
238.
See interview with Study Participant CS109; see also interview with Study
Participant CS58 (stating that she ―had to borrow from family to pay off payday loans.
Sounds too good to be true and it is‖).
239.
See interview with Study Participants CS15, CS79.
240.
See interview with Study Participant CS29.
241.
See interview with Study Participant CS40.
242.
See interview with Study Participant CS20.
243.
See interview with Study Participant CS42.
244.
See interview with Study Participant CS66.
245.
See interview with Study Participant CS45. Two of the worst stories I heard
during the office interviews were about a credit repair organization that took $4000 to
negotiate bills, ultimately used $1400 to pay bills, and took $2600 in fees. See interview
with Study Participants SB02, SB03.
246.
See interview with Study Participants CS16, CS52, CS70.
247.
See interview with Study Participant CS64.
248.
Some people said they were embarrassed to ask a family member for money.
See interviews with Study Participants CS10, CS38, CS60, CS71, CS81, CS85. One or two
said borrowing from friends could ruin the friendship. See interview with Study Participants
CS23, CS84. One said she did not want to ask at work because she did not want to ―be
personal at work or in debt at work‖). See interview with Study Participant CS39. Many
said getting a payday or installment loan was easier, faster, and more convenient. See, e.g.,
interview with Study Participants CS6, CS38, CS72, CS78.
249.
These are admittedly non-economic concerns, making the cost even more
complex to calculate.
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were less ubiquitous, people might be forced to exhaust low-cost options before
turning to these businesses for cash.
As for the other half of respondents who had no other places to obtain
cash, one might wonder how badly they could be hurt by the lack of available
credit. In many cases, however, the results were not dire. Many people said they
would default on their bills or incur overdraft charges. These responses, totaling
16.34% of those surveyed, ranged from one individual who said she would miss a
car payment to another who said his electricity would be cut off.250 No other
specifics were provided about the consequences of defaulting on these obligations.
In fact, one person who was borrowing money to keep from defaulting on his bills
acknowledged that if he could not get the loan, ―the bill collectors would have to
wait.‖251 This demonstrates one theme we found among many payday borrowers:
many are averse to paying any bill late. Payday lenders provide a highly expensive
solution to a potentially cost-free problem: paying some bills late, including some
utilities, results in no extra charge at all.
7. Customers Do Not Shop Around
When asked if they considered getting a loan from another payday lender,
78.64% of respondents said they had not. If they said they shopped around, they
were prompted to explain. Once prompted, only one person said that he called
around to check rates.252 It appears that the vast majority of customers do not shop
around for short-term loans; instead, they choose their lender based upon
convenience, location, and other factors such as recommendations from friends.
Some people reported that because they were using the loans to pay for other
short-term loans, the primary goal was to find a new lender from which to borrow
to pay the old lender. Some respondents had numerous loans outstanding for years
at a time with many different lenders.

IV. REGULATION P: SHOULD WE REGULATE PAYDAY LENDING,
AND IF SO, HOW?
Ineffective regulation is extremely costly to society and should be
avoided. Situations involving failed markets, information asymmetry, and
innumeracy—all of which are problems in the payday and other short-term lending
industries—are ripe for regulation. The results of New Mexico-style legislation
serve as a contraindication to their implementation, leaving open the question of
what might actually work.
A. Classic Failed Market
Perfect markets are competitive. 253 In the perfect market, many sellers
offer substantially identical products, so it is easy to shop around and compare
250.
See interview with Study Participants CS52 and CS148.
251.
See interview with Study Participant CS03; see also interview with Study
Participants CS13, CS14, CS16, CS18, CS19, CS21, CS28, CS47 (all indicating that if they
could not get the loan, they would have to default on regular bills or just pay late).
252.
See interview with Study Participant CS48.
253.
Bertics, supra note 14, at 141.
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costs.254 There are also many buyers. 255 All actors in the perfect market act to
maximize their own financial well-being.256 There are no barriers to entry into the
market by new sellers, and both buyers and sellers are well-informed.257 In a
perfect market, supply and demand for products will level out and the price of
goods will stabilize.258 The absence of any of these attributes is known as market
failure.259
An imperfect market does not adjust in response to competition.260
Sometimes, this is because there is no meaningful competition.261 This can occur
when sellers create a monopoly or price-fix such that the market can no longer
respond to normal supply and demand. Certain conditions create fertile ground for
market failure. For example, collusion among sellers may create more profits than
competition among sellers, creating temptation to collude rather than compete.262
This temptation is stronger in young industries with few competitors, where buyers
have difficulty shopping around on the basis of price. 263 This is particularly true in
industries where the primary choice of one seller over another is based on
something other than price. 264
The payday lending and other short-term lending industries are classic
failed markets. The industry is young, having developed primarily in the 1990s.
Thus, price competition is not yet necessary to create a strong market share.
Rather, most lenders charge similar amounts for the same loan, typically the
largest amount permitted by law. In addition, payday customers are not necessarily
sophisticated and, as Part III demonstrates, they typically do not understand the
cost of these loans. Moreover, they do not shop around. 265 Finally, a factor other
than price—convenience—drives most borrower choices in this industry. Lenders
are therefore able to charge more than they could if the customer shopped around,
had perfect information, and understood the cost of this credit.
When market forces are functioning properly, economists disdain
intervention in and regulation of markets. 266 Even the staunchest libertarian would
agree, however, that failed markets create a need for regulation. The current
payday lending situation warrants legislation. Ohio State Representative William

254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.
259.
Id. at 142.
260.
Pearl Chin, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 723, 740-42 (2004).
261.
See Bertics, supra note 14, at 142.
262.
See id.
263.
Id.
264.
Chin, supra note 260, at 742; Bertics, supra note 14, at 142.
265.
See Chin, supra note 2600, at 742.
266.
Benjamin D. Faller, Payday Loan Solutions: Slaying the Hydra (and Keeping
it Dead), 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 125, 139 (2008).

52

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 52:3

Batchelder, a conservative proponent of payday lending reform, describes the
dilemma as follows:
I have always been a vocal supporter of free enterprise, and have
opposed needless and burdensome regulation. However, these
abusive practices are a threat to the free markets which are so
critical to our state‘s prosperity. Adam Smith, the great prophet of
free enterprise, believed there had to be limitations on interest in
order to preserve a free market. What Smith would think of an APR
of 300%, I cannot imagine.267

As Representative Batchelder acknowledges here, the market has not driven down
prices, nor is it likely to do so as the industry ages, since price does not enter into
the calculus of most borrowers. The market failure is exacerbated by information
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower, and the innumeracy of
borrowers.268
B. Information Asymmetry and Innumeracy: 200% of Nothing
Part III of this Article demonstrated that payday and installment loan
customers have difficulty understanding the meaning of the annual percentage rate
disclosure or the overall cost of their loans in dollars. There are several reasons for
this. First, lenders have far more information about how the loans work than
customers do. They control the terms, so they can change the product and even the
terms of existing loans. Whether this is designed to confuse customers or not, the
result is the same: customers are at a considerable disadvantage. Second, the loans
are described in terms of a certain amount of fees per $100 borrowed, which
causes many consumers to believe the number—say $15 or $20 per $100
borrowed—represents the annual percentage rate, not the rate for two weeks.
Lenders know the truth. Most borrowers do not.
Information asymmetry is not the only problem customers encounter with
these loans, however. Americans as a whole suffer from general financial
illiteracy.269 This is especially true when the financial information at issue involves
267.
Id.; see also PARRISH & KING, supra note 42, at 22 (suggesting that the lack
of state regulation in Texas is responsible for higher payday loan fees).
268.
See Faller, supra note 266, at 139–40. As Benjamin Faller explains:
Lenders then take advantage of a borrower‘s financial predicament to trap them in a
loan they cannot pay off. This inequality of power is yet another reason why market failure
has occurred. It is also a key reason why well-off individuals and people in stable financial
situations are not flocking to payday lenders in the same numbers as their less-advantaged
counterparts. Consequently, we cannot rely on typical market forces to solve the problems
associated with payday loans and must resort to regulatory solutions to accomplish the ends
that the market cannot.
269.
See Susan-Block-Lieb, Mandatory Protections as Veiled Threats, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 425, 431 (2004) (stating that ―if a significant portion of the U.S. population
struggles to read and write in English on topics of general interest, then most certainly it
will fail to comprehend descriptions of financial transactions that necessarily involve more
complex concepts and vocabulary‖); see also A.K. DEWDNEY, 200% OF NOTHING: AN EYEOPENING TOUR THROUGH THE TWISTS AND TURNS OF MATH ABUSE AND INNUMERACY, V, 1
(Steve Ross & Emily Louse eds., 1993).
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long disclosures full of unfamiliar vocabulary. In fact, the disclosures given in
connection with consumer finance transactions in general are of questionable
utility.270 Consumers are overwhelmed by too much information in many legallyrequired disclosures, and thus the disclosures do little if anything to educate them
about the risk of credit products.271 Additionally, consumers do not always read
these disclosures.272
These data suggest that regulating the short-term loan industry through
disclosure does not work. These disclosures may even be harmful to consumers.
The fact that APR and other terms must be disclosed has led some lawmakers to
think they have effectively regulated payday lending, when the reality is quite the
opposite.
Math illiteracy, or innumeracy, is widespread. 273 High school math skills
in the United States are among the worst in the developed world. The United
States also has the most complex, developed, and arguably unregulated, consumer
credit market in the world. 274 This perfect storm renders the average consumer a
lamb to the slaughter for unscrupulous creditors. In his book 200% of Nothing,
A.K. Dewdney notes that, as a general matter, we are beset more than ever by
abuses stemming from innumeracy. 275 We become prey to ―commercial chicanery,
financial foolery, medical quackery, and even numerical terrorism.‖276
While innumeracy plays a large role in the short-term loan crisis, the
problem is not unique to the world of payday or other short-term loans. Credit
cards and debit cards are other examples of products that consumers do not

270.
Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN.
L. & POL‘Y REV. 233, 261–62 (2002) (relying on recent data on illiteracy to argue that
commonly used contract and disclosure forms are incomprehensible to most American
consumers).
271
Elizabeth J. Keeler, The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of
1980: Is “Simplification” Better for Both Consumer and Creditor, 8 NOVA. L. J. 175, 18485 (1983) (discussing how consumers overwhelmed with information will fail to digest any
of the disclosures); Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from
Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and the Law of Information Disclosure for Quality
Assessment in Health Care, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 250 (1995) (―Critics of the original
Truth In Lending Act charged that Truth in Lending disclosures overwhelmed consumers
with too much complicated information and ultimately discouraged them from credit
shopping.‖).
272.
Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive
Biases and Payday Borrowing (Univ. Chi. Booth Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 10-01,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532213.
273.
Dewdney, supra note 269, at 2.
274

Id.

275.
Id., as Dewdney states: ―[l]iteracy, after all, concerns a translation skill—
learning to move easily between written and spoken speech. Numeracy concerns thought
itself. You might exploit people‘s innumeracy through an advertisement, for example,
making a claim that seems to be valid but isn‘t. But how would you exploit their illiteracy
through an ad they can‘t even read?‖
276

Id.
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understand,277 as are mortgages.278 One study showed that less than one-third of
Americans could explain or understand how the fees and interest are calculated on
credit cards.279
Another study of adult innumeracy showed that while many individuals
can perform simple arithmetic operations when both the numbers and operations
are made explicit, they are unable to do so when these same operations are
performed on numbers that must be located and extracted from different types of
documents that contain similar but irrelevant information, or when these
operations must be inferred from printed directions. 280
Moreover, while
innumeracy is rampant throughout American society, the less financially literate
one is, the higher interest one tends to pay on borrowed money. 281
The adult innumeracy study referenced above, and others like it, may
explain why consumers have difficulty understanding the true cost of payday loans
and other short-term debt.282 Only 4% of the consumers in the adult innumeracy
277.
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS (Andrew Brasher & Nick Bunch eds., 2006).
278.
New rules require lenders to give borrowers a standard statement clearly
showing all details, helping homebuyers avoid financial land mines and other nasty traps.
James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Terms Now in Plain English, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2010,
available at http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomeFinancing/mortgageterms-now-in-plain-english.aspx.
279.
Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences,
and Overindebtedness 1, (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w14808,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1366208 (last
visited Aug. 18, 2010) .
280.
Block-Lieb, supra note 269, at 438; IRWIN KIRSCH ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, TECHNICAL REPORT AND DATA FILE USER 'S MANUAL FOR THE 1992
NATIONAL
ADULT
LITERACY
SURVEY
(2001),
available
at
http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001457.pdf. Professor Block-Lieb analyses this study
in her article. The study, commissioned by the National Adult Literacy Survey found little
difference among prose, document, and quantitative literacy. (―The three literacy scales—
prose, document, and quantitative literacy—are relatively highly related . . . .‖). This is not
to applaud the quantitative literacy of the respondents, however. Indeed, 22% of the
respondents performed at Level One: ―able to add numbers on a bank deposit slip, or to
perform other simple arithmetic operations using numbers presented to them.‖ Another 25%
of the respondents demonstrated Level Two quantitative literacy skills. ―Individuals in
Level 2 on the quantitative scale were likely to give correct responses to a task involving a
single arithmetic operation using numbers that can easily be located in printed material.‖
Block-Lieb, supra note 269, at 438.
281.
See id. at 438-39.
282
Id. Concrete examples of the sorts of quantitative tasks pertaining to the
various literacy levels measured by the above referenced adult innumeracy study illuminate
the difficulties American consumers must experience when engaging in household
commercial transactions. Id. at 439. For example, one task required the reader to locate the
appropriate shipping charges in a table before entering the correct amount on an order form
and calculating the total price for ordering office supplies.” Id. The tasks were given a level
number, indicating their difficulty. This task was assigned a scale value of 270, or Level
Two. “A score of 312, or Level 3, was assigned to a table of money rates that asked the
reader to determine how much more interest would be earned in money market accounts
provided by mutual funds than in those provided by savings and loan associations.” Id..
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study were able to calculate the payments on a home equity loan. 283 The cost of
payday loan transactions may be even more complex than those of the home
mortgage loans asked about in the adult innumeracy study. Based upon the study
described in this Article, the actual cost of payday loans over time is not easily
translated into an annual percentage rate, making it difficult for consumers to
compare the cost of credit.

CONCLUSION
Our curbside empirical study of payday lending customers was designed
to find out what brings customers into payday lenders, how customers choose their
lenders, and how well customers understand the terms of the loans they take out.
Before we could actually interview customers and ask them about the terms of
their loans, we felt we needed to find out what terms lenders were actually
offering. When we investigated the terms offered by the lenders, we learned that
few of the lenders seemed to be complying with a new law passed in the state
where the study took place. This information led us to a series of loopholes created
by lenders in order to circumvent the new law. These loopholes became the story
within the story, and now create a clear roadmap for states wishing to avoid
meaningless payday loan legislation. As a result, this Article provides a detailed
description of what not to do.
The findings in the curbside interviews, augmented by the office
interviews, however, provide a strong case for why more meaningful legislation is
desperately needed. A large percentage of payday customers seem to use payday
or installment loans not for occasional emergencies, as the industry would have us
believe, but to pay regular bills. At high rates of interest, these loans make it more
difficult to make ends meet because the loan (or loans) actually increase the
borrower‘s ongoing expenses. The data show that many customers have low-cost
or no-cost options but use payday loans instead because they are more convenient
and less embarrassing than some of the alternatives. These data suggest that having
an unlimited supply of payday loans available hurts rather than helps customers in
the long run.
The data further suggest that payday and installment loan customers
generally do not shop around for price when taking out a loan, but rather pick their
lender based upon location or the recommendation of a friend or family member.
This creates a classic market failure, and thus a need for effective regulation.

One of the most difficult quantitative tasks the survey asked readers to perform involved
reading a newspaper advertisement for a home equity loan and explaining how they would
calculate the total amount of interest charges to be paid.” It asked respondents to imagine
they needed to borrow $10,000, and asked them to find the advertisement for a home equity
loan in a provided newspaper. It then asked participants to explain to an interviewer how
she would compute the total amount of interest charges due under this loan plan, where the
terms offered were a 14.25% fixed rate mortgage under various payment options. Only 4%
of the study respondents were able to successfully complete this task. Id.
283

See id.
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Finally, the data show that customers have a difficulty understanding the
dollar costs of these loans, stating the annual percentage rate, or comparing the
cost of this credit to other forms of available credit. Some even believe that these
loans are cheaper than credit cards or even student loans. Innumeracy—or the
inability to do math—is partly responsible for these mistaken beliefs, and is not
unique to payday lending customers. 284 Most of us suffer from innumeracy to some
degree, and the evidence of innumeracy here supports the need to regulate these
loans, despite the contention that doing so is deeply paternalistic.
One thing this Article does not do is describe the legislation that might be
meaningful in this context. A federal interest rate cap is one possible solution to
the short-term loan problem, particularly in light of the failure of New Mexicostyle regulation to meaningfully effect short-term loan practices in the state. The
industry‘s ability to evade more detailed and invasive laws, as well as states‘
inability to efficiently regulate all products at once, may make rate caps that apply
to all loans one of the few truly effective methods of regulation. 285 This question of
what solution will ultimately work is worthy of further scholarly discussion.

284

For example, the Author recently had a very hard time convincing a
newspaper reporter that $15 per $100 for fourteen days was not 15% per annum.
285.

See Johnson, supra note 145, at 43.
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APPPENDIX A: ENGLISH VERSION
DATE:______________
Lender Zip Code:___________________
Respondent ID #:
Lender ID:___________________
Greetings! I am a law student at UNM and am working on a study of
payday lending. We are offering $10 or a $10 gift card in exchange for a ten
minute interview. Would you like to participate?
The interviews are anonymous and all you need to do to qualify is to have
gotten a payday loan or installment loan here in the last month.
Introduction
Did you get a payday loan or Installment loan? _____ (Y/N) Which
type?____________ __________ Approx. date of Loan.
First, I‘m going to ask a couple background questions.
D1—What is your zip code at your home address? ______________
D2—What is your work zip code?________
Q1—What brought you to this payday lender when you got the loan?
write it down verbatim (if they just say ―needed money‖ or ―bills,‖ ask for what)
Q2—If you had been unable to get a payday/installment loan today, what
would you have done instead, in other words, what would have been your next best
alternative?____________
A4—Did you consider getting this money from another source besides a
payday lender? _______Which_______________(maybe ask bank, family
member, credit card, pawn shop, employer for an advance on pay?)
A4.5—Why did you decide to take out a payday loan instead?_______
Next I have a few questions about the loan that you got
L1—How much cash did you take away/borrow (in dollars)?
_____________
L2—How many days before you are expected to pay it back?
_____________
L4—Do you expect to be able to pay it back within this time
frame?__________
L3—Do you know how much you can expect to pay in fees and/or
interest? ______ ___________How much?
The next couple questions are going to involve a little bit of math.
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L5—Do you know about how much the loan would cost if you needed to
keep it out (not pay back what you borrowed) for a month? For example, do you
know the total amount you would be charged in fees and extra charges?_________
How much_________
L6—Do you know about how much the loan would cost if you needed to
keep it out (not pay back what you borrowed) for about a year? For example, do
you know the total amount you would be charged in fees and extra
costs?_________
How much________
L7—Have you heard the term ―annual percentage rate?‖_____
L8—Many people don‘t know the answer to the next question, but if you
do, would you tell me what the annual percentage rate for this loan is_______
A few questions about your past experience with payday loans
P1—Payday loans are becoming more and more common. Can you recall
how many payday loans, total, you have taken out, say in the past TWO YEARS?
________
P2—Including the loan that you took out this time, what is the total dollar
amount of all payday loans you currently have outstanding now?
Principle owed: ____________ Interest/fees owed: ____________
A few questions about how you chose this lender and this type of loan
A1—Have you used this lender before?___________
A2—How did you hear about this lender?_________
A3—Do you remember why you decided to borrow from this particular
lender?_______
L6—Before taking out this loan, did you look into borrowing money from
another payday lender instead? ___________
If not, why not?______________
A5—Do you have a credit card? __________
If answered NO to A5, SKIP to E1.
A6—Do you know what the interest rate is on your credit card or cards?
__________
How much_____
A7—Are your credit cards maxed out? ___________
A8—If no, could you tell me about how much credit you still have
available on your cards? For example, how much more could you charge on them
without going over the limit? ____________
A9—Why did you choose to take out a payday loan rather than charge
(item) to your credit card or get a cash advance?

2009]

PAYDAY LOAN PRACTICES

59

A few questions about what the payday lender has told you
E1—Were you offered an installment option (e.g. payment plan), a
payday loan, or both? ___________
If offered installment:
E2—What when and how are you supposed to pay the installment plan
back, if you know?___________
If offered payday:
E3—Did the clerk tell you that you have the right to cancel the payday
loan at no charge any time before 5:00 pm on the next business day? ________
A few questions relating to compliance with the new New Mexico law
S1—A new law here in New Mexico protects consumers by limiting the
percentage of their income that can be tied up in repaying paying payday loans.
Can you tell me about how much money you earned/took home last
month?_____________
S2—What is your estimated hourly pay rate? _______ (or salary if no
work by the hour______) (or social security by the month_________)
S3—Last week, how many hours did you work?
Finally just two questions about collection attempts and payday loans
R1—Have you ever been late or past due on repaying a payday loan?
_______
R2—How did the lender follow up? In other words, if they called you,
what did they say? Or if they sent a letter, what did it say? Or were there any other
types of actions from your lender?
Conclusion
That is the end of my questions. Do you have any questions for me about
this research?
Would like to share any other thoughts about your loans or about the
interview process?
Here is your compensation, thank you very much for helping us with our
research.
Thanks and take care!

